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ABSTRACT
Recently, attention h as been given to the cognitive processing of aversive
emotional, or threat-related, information. Although investigations have often
focused on anxiety disordered individuals, it is suggested that examination of
"normal" individuals with varying levels of anxiety will increase the
understanding of the cognitive processing of aversive emotional, or threatrelated, information. It h as been hypothesized that high anxious individuals
exhibit an attentional bias toward threat-related emotional information. The
resp o n se of low anxious individuals to threat-related information is unclear.
S om e evidence su g g ests that non-anxiety disordered individuals employ a
m echanism that inhibits or interferes with the processing of threat-related,
em otional information.
The current study exam ines the cognitive processing of aversive
emotional, or threat-related, information using a lexical decision task (LDT).
The LDT, which requires subjects to decide if a letter string is or is not a word,
h a s exam ined cognitive processing of nonemotional information a s well a s
aversive emotional, or threat-related, information. In the current study, 94
subjects with differing anxiety levels, indexed by the STAI, responded to a
computer-driven LDT. The LDT included 384 trials consisting of an attention
capturing plus (+) sign followed by a prime word which w as replaced by a
target letter string. Subjects indicated w hether the target letter string
rep resen ted a word in the English language by pressing keys on a com puter
keyboard. The design of the study involved a 2 x 4 withinsubjects variation of target word emotionality (emotional, nonemotional),
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and th e relationship betw een th e prime and target words (emotional prime
unrelated to target [e.g. STUPID-BEATEN], nonemotional prime unrelated to
target [e.g. CRADLE-BEATEN], prime related to target [e.g. ABUSEDBEATEN], and prime identical to target [e.g. BEATEN-BEATEN]). Word
length and familiarity w ere m atched betw een categories. Emotionality of
words and sem antic relatedness w as determ ined by pilot subjects. Results
indicated general support for the existence of a m echanism that ap p ears to
com pete, inhibit, or interfere with the processing of emotional information.
High and low anxious individuals exhibited differential patterns of the
hypothesized inhibition. R esults also indicated greater interference of
processing social threat in com parison to physical threat or nonemotional
targets.

INTRODUCTION
R ecent theories su g g est that individuals with emotional disorders such
a s depressive and anxiety disorders selectively attend to information that is
congruent with the predom inant mood (see Logan & G oetsch, 1993;
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988 for reviews). It h as been
hypothesized that this attentional bias may be involved in the etiology and
m aintenance of the emotional disorder. Although not without debate, an
attentional bias toward threat-related information h as been docum ented for
anxiety disordered individuals (Logan & G oetsch, 1993; Eysenck, Mogg,
May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Williams et al., 1988). Clinically, the
phenom enon is observed when the anxious individual is hypervigilant to
anxiety-producing, or threat-related stimuli. A sn ak e phobic individual, for
exam ple, m ay be hypervigilant to long objects on the ground that a p p ear to
be snake-like in sh a p e or movement. A social phobic individual may be
hypervigilant to any signs of negative evaluation in the faces or body posture
of others. In addition to hypervigilance to threat-related stimuli, anxiety
disordered individuals often exhibit a tendency to interpret am biguous stimuli
a s threatening or anxiety-producing (Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987;
M athews, Richards & Eysenck, 1989). The social phobic individual may
interpret a yawning supervisor a s clear evidence that the conversation is
boring.
It is generally accepted that the identification of anxiety-producing, or
threat-related, stimuli is asso ciated with increased arousal which is
asso ciated with increased hypervigilance for anxiety-producing, or
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threat-related stimuli (Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989; Ohm an, 1988).
O hm an (1988) h as pointed out that the association betw een increased
arousal and increased hypervigilance may be beneficial for survival. O nce a
potentially threatening stim ulus is perceived, increased arousal "readies" the
physiological system to prepare for "fight or flight". Increased hypervigilance
"prompts" th e perceptual system to scan the environment for evidence to
confirm and identify the potentially threatening stimulus.
For th e anxiety-disordered individual however, the cycle of attentional
bias toward threat-related information, increased arousal, and increased
hypervigilance to threat-related information can becom e dysfunctional due to
th e inability to reduce hypervigilance and the potential interpretation of
am biguous stimuli a s threatening. In contrast to anxiety-disordered
individuals, low anxious individuals do not ap p ear to exhibit an attentional
bias tow ards threat-related information. It is important to understand how low
anxious individuals respond to threat-related information. This is especially
relevant if the desired treatm ent outcom e goal for anxiety-disordered
individuals is to change their hypervigilance into a pattern of attention
exhibited by low anxious individuals.
S om e theorists have su g g ested that low anxious individuals are able to
inhibit responding to threatening information, similar to the notion of
perceptual d efen se (Dixon, 1981 for a review). R ecent evidence h a s
supported th e existence of a m echanism that interferes or inhibits the
processing of threat-related information (Fox, 1994; Jackson & G eer, 1993b).
In fact, low anxious individuals have been found to exhibit a bias away from
threat-related information (Williams et al., 1988). O ne m ean s of investigating
th e differential responding for threat-related and neutral, or nonemotional,
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information h a s been the examination of the cognitive processing of threatrelated, emotional information. The current study utilizes a lexical decision
task (LDT) from cognitive psychology experim ents.
The LDT, which requires subjects to decide if a letter string is or is not a
word in th e English language, h as successfully been used to exam ine
cognitive processing of nonemotional information and recently h a s been
u sed to exam ine aversive emotional, or threat-related, information (Hill &
Kemp-W heeler, 1989a; 1989b; Jackson & G eer, 1993b; Neely, 1990).
R esearch involving nonemotional stimuli in the LDT indicates that subjects
respond faster to target words which are primed by semantically related
prime words (e.g. NURSE-DOCTOR) rather than unrelated prime words (e.g.
CHAIR-DOCTOR). The facilitation of responding due to the relationship
betw een th e prime and target stimuli is referred to a s the facilitory priming
effect.
R esearch ers have also found evidence of this facilitory priming effect
when prime words and target words w ere emotionally, but not semantically,
related (e.g. FATAL-CRUEL) (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989b; Jackson & Geer,
1993b; Kemp-W heeler & Hill, 1991). This facilitory priming effect w as not
found when th e prime and target words w ere both semantically and
emotionally related (e.g. FATAL-DEATH) (Jackson & G eer, 1993b). It w as
su g g ested that this lack of sem antic priming when both prime and target
w ords w ere emotional w as d u e to an inhibitory m echanism operating within a
sem antic network. In particular, it w as suggested that activation of the
m eaning of th e stimuli, physiological arousal w as increased and then
inhibited. They proposed that th e inhibition necessarily inhibited the
m eaning and interfered, delayed, or inhibited responding to the stimulus.
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B ased on th e se suggestions, they concluded that the hypothesized inhibition
m echanism reduced th e facilitory priming effect of semantically related
em otional words.
This study w as designed to investigate the cognitive processing of
aversive emotional, or threat-related, information within a priming lexical
decision task paradigm. This study w as also designed to exam ine individual
differences in state and trait anxiety for their effects upon responding to
emotional and non-emotional stimuli. B ecause recent data indicated that
differing levels of anxiety are associated with differential motor functioning
(Jackson & G eer, 1993a) and this cognitive task requires a motor response
a s the indicator of cognitive functioning, the current investigation u se s motor
responding a s a covariate in the analysis of data. Using motor responding a s
a covariate allows th e examination of differences in responding to emotional
and nonem otional stimuli due to state and trait anxiety with a more precise
m easurem ent of cognitive processing. The following discussion reviews the
terminology, theories, and research relevant to the current task s and
hypothesized inhibitory m echanism . The cognitive task will be reviewed first
followed by a review of the motor task and predictions for individual
differences.

Cognitive Task
Predictions for the priming lexical decision task are b ased on theories
derived from network system theory (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Bower, 1981;
Collins & Loftus, 1975). Predictions for the effects of aversive emotional
information within a priming lexical decision task are derived from theories of
emotion and cognition (Williams et al., 1988) a s well a s previous research
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efforts (Fox, 1994; Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989a; 1989b; Jackson & Geer,
1993b). The following is a brief discussion of the terminology, research, and
theories involved in determining hypotheses concerning the cognitive task.

Network System Theory
The current investigation used a network system theory and an
information processing approach a s frameworks for understanding cognitive
processing. Network system s such a s those described by Anderson and
Bower (1973) and Collins and Loftus (1975) are heuristically valuable to the
study of cognition. T h ese frameworks were expanded in the network theory
proposed by Bower (1981) which unifies cognitive and emotion processing.
The information processing approach (IPA) h as also proven useful a s a
framework for investigations of cognitive perform ance (Anderson, 1990).
The IPA a ssu m es that external and internal stimuli are perceived by a
mental system which then cognitively p ro cesses the stimuli. According to
network system theory, information is stored a s nodes which may be
processed, stored, or brought into aw areness. A w areness refers to the
mental sta te w here information enters consciousness. N odes are believed to
have aw aren ess thresholds which refer to the am ount of activation required
to bring a node of information into aw areness.
As a m ean s of bringing information into aw areness, network system
theory a ssu m e s that information stored a s nodes are activated. Activation,
often equ ated to neural stimulation, serves to d e c re a se the node’s
aw aren ess threshold, making the node more accessible to consciousness.
Activation then sp read s to nodes linked to the activated node by
associations, such a s similarity of meaning. This process is known a s the
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"spreading of activation." The su bsequent activation of linked nodes is
believed to be of a lesser value than the activation of the original node. The
subthreshold activation of associated nodes is referred to a s "priming." The
spreading of activation and priming p ro cesses are assu m ed to occur
automatically and without volition or aw areness. It is notable that in the IPA
framework, the term s perception and cognition do not imply aw areness, or
rather, perception and cognition do not require aw areness.
In th e current investigation, network theory serves a s a framework for
examining th e relationship betw een cognition an d emotion. Use of network
theory a s a framework rather than a model h as been recom m ended (Williams
et al., 1988). As a framework, the theory can be used to discuss phenom ena
rather than predict it. Terminology from network theory such a s the storage of
information a s nodes, spreading of activation and priming can be valuable for
discussing th e relationship betw een cognition and emotion. According to
Bower (1981) nodes can represent em otions and information. Bower also
su g g e sts that term s such a s spreading activation and priming are applicable
to both em otions and cognitive information. The placem ent of emotion within
a network system h as important implications for the linking of emotional
stimuli and emotional physiological arousal.

Emotion within a Network System
In Bower's theory (1981) em otions are represented a s nodes within the
sam e network a s nonemotional information. Similar to other nodes, emotion
no d es are associated, or linked, to other nodes. Emotion nodes may be
linked to nodes representing m em ories that occurred when that emotion w as
aro u sed a s well a s to nodes representing information that is associated with
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that emotion. In this theory, the emotion node is also associated with
physiological responding and behaviors. B ecause emotion no d es are
susceptible to the sp read of activation, mood may serve to prime nodes
linked to the emotion. This conceptualization provides the rationale for
Bower's theory of state-dependent learning and retrieval. This theory
su g g e sts that information h a s a greater likelihood of being recalled when the
current mood state is congruent to the mood state present when the
information w as stored. Although research h as provided inconsistent results
for m ood-dependent learning and retrieval, this theory continues to guide
research ers (Mathews, 1988; Warburton, 1988).
Although many network theories, such a s Bower's (1981), have briefly
exam ined th e interaction betw een emotional stimuli and emotional
responding, few theories have exam ined the the exact nature of the
relationship betw een emotional information and physiological emotional
responding. Lang and his colleagues (Lang, 1979; Lang, Kozak, Miller,
Levin, & McLean, 1980) offer a bio-informational network theory which
directly a d d re ss e s the relationship betw een emotional information and
em otional responding.
In Lang's bio-informational network model, information is stored a s three
types of propositions. Propositions can be conceptualized a s similar to
n o d es or storage se ts of information. First, stimuli which precede or occur
with the concept are stored a s stimulus propositions. Second, behavioral
re sp o n ses asso ciated with th e concept are stored a s resp o n se propositions.
Finally, m eaning propositions, which are sem antic in nature, are the result of
com binations of other propositions. Meaning propositions define the
significance of the concept. Lang proposes that information is brought into
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aw aren ess/co n scio u sn ess by activating th e se highly related propositions.
Activating a sufficient num ber of propositions results in an emotion cluster
being activated a s a single unit.
Lang su g g ests that the activation of m eaning propositions n ecessitates
th e activation of associated resp o n se propositions. Behavioral resp o n ses
asso ciated with a concept's m eaning are fundam ental to the m eaning
proposition and are automatically activated in parallel to m eaning and
stim ulus propositions. R esearch investigating the autom atic activation of
em otional responding a s indexed by physiological m easu res supports
Lang's theory (Mathews et al., 1989; Ohman, 1988).
M athews et al. (1989) investigated the relationship betw een word
emotionality and physiological arousal. Their study utilized hom ophones,
w ords with different spellings and m eanings but pronounced the sa m e (e.g.
die/dye), and used skin conductance a s a m easure of physiological
responding. Results indicated that skin conductance ch an g es w ere
correlated with presentation of negative emotional stimuli. This correlation
w as significant acro ss subject groups of clinically anxious, recovered
anxious, and non-anxious controls. Ohm an (1988) h a s also found an
association betw een the presentation of emotional stimuli and increased
physiological arousal, a s indexed by skin conductance changes. Results
from th e se studies support Lang's bio-informational theory wherein m eaning
propositions are necessarily associated with resp o n se propositions. In other
words, autom atic activation of physiological responding is asso ciated with
th e perception of emotional stimuli.
O hm an (1988) d iscu sses th e association betw een emotional responding
and perception of emotional stimuli and the necessity and im portance of a
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preattentive, or automatic, m echanism for detecting emotionality. The
autom atic activation of emotional responding is an adaptive behavior when
an emotion provoking stimulus is present. Overactivation of emotional
responding however is not an adaptive behavior. Hypervigilance to
emotional stimuli and overreaction of emotional responding is considered
dysfunctional and is described a s a possible basis for several mental
disorders (Williams et al., 1988; Barlow, 1988). The m eans of stopping,
inhibiting, or som ehow decreasing autom atic emotional arousal when an
individual perceives an emotional stimulus is vital to the individual's ability to
function. M echanism s which prevent or d ec re a se overactivation of
emotional, physiological responding are rarely d iscussed in theories of
emotion and cognition. Most theories, such a s Lang's theory, are unclear
concerning the termination of the physiological arousal. Ohman (1988),
however, offers hypotheses concerning the termination of autom atic
physiological arousal to prevent this overactivation of arousal when an
individual perceives an emotional stimulus.
Although it may be su g g ested that automatically activated physiological
arousal passively decays similarly to the passive decay of activation
proposed by selective attention m odels (e.g. K ahnem an & Triesman, 1984),
O hm an su g g ests that an inhibitory m echanism o p erates to actively inhibit the
arousal. Specifically, Ohman proposes that the perceptual system sc a n s the
environment for emotionally meaningful stimuli and gives priority to
processing such material by a procedure often referred to a s autom atic
vigilance. Automatic vigilance to emotionally meaningful stimuli h a s also
been proposed by several other theorists (Bargh, Litt, Pratto, & Spielman,
1988; Pratto & John, 1991). This procedure serv es to sp eed responding to
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emotional stimuli and activate nodes associated by emotional or sem antic
m eaning. Ohm an, however, also postulates the existence of an evaluating
m echanism within the network system which determ ines the necessity of
physiological arousal. If the arousal is unnecessary, an inhibitory
m echanism actively inhibits th e physiological arousal. The implications of
this inhibition on the priming of emotionally or semantically related no d es are
speculative. Information may be gained by reviewing the work of other
research ers (e.g. D agenbach, Carr, & Barnhardt, 1990; Fox, 1993a; 1994;
Tipper & Driver, 1988; Yee, 1991) who have also proposed inhibitory
m echanism s working within th e network system.
Most of th e se researchers did not exam ine the inhibition of emotional
arousal or emotional stimuli, but merely the inhibition of nonemotional
information for functions such a s aiding selective attention and decreasing
processing capacity allotted to irrelevant or distracting stimuli. In the
following section, investigations of an inhibitory process operating on
nonemotional information within a network system are exam ined a s well a s
investigations involving inhibitory process operating on emotional
information.

Inhibition of Nonemotional Stimuli within a Network System
Using a variety of cognitive paradigms, researchers have investigated the
possibility of inhibitory m echanism s operating on nonemotional stimuli within
a network system . R esearch conducted by Tipper and his colleagues
(Allport, Tipper, & Chimel, 1985; Tipper, 1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985;
Tipper & Driver, 1988; Tipper, W eaver, Kirkpatrick, & Lewis, 1991),
D agenbach, et al. (1990), and Y ee (1991) supports the existence of an
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inhibitory m echanism that aids in selective attention by decreasing attention
given to irrelevant or distracting stimuli. In each of th e se studies, inhibition
refers to a slowing of expected reaction time. W hen reaction time is
significantly slower than expected, the stimulus is said to have been
"inhibited" or that som e p ro cess has interfered with processing the stimulus.
Tipper and his colleagues report that the inhibitory effects of consciously
ignoring information aids selective attention. In each of th ese studies,
subjects w ere asked to respond to a target while ignoring one or more
distractors. The process of ignoring the distractors, or inhibiting the attention
given to th e distractors, should result in facilitation of responding to the target.
If inhibition occurred, reaction tim es should be slowed when the target w as
th e sa m e a s the distractor in a previous trial. R esults indicated that in
conditions w here the target w as the sam e a s the distractor, responding to the
target w as slowed. This slowing w as accepted a s evidence for an inhibitory
p ro cess that interfered or com peted with activation of the target word (Tipper,
1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985). Tipper (1985) also exam ined the effects of
an ignored distractor stimulus of one trial on the following trial's target
stimulus. This study found the inhibitory effect when the target and distractor
pair w ere not identical but w ere semantically related line drawings, such a s
drawings of a dog and a cat. Tipper and Driver (1988) found this inhibitory
effect w hen the target and distractor pair were semantically related words
and line drawings, such a s th e word dog and the drawing of a cat. Hoffman
and McMillan (1985) replicated this inhibitory effect using a priming lexical
decision task. Subjects w ere instructed to ignore the prime words and
respond to the target letter string. R esponses w ere slower when the ignored
prime w as semantically related, rather than unrelated, to the target word.

12

This finding is particularly important b ecau se the results directly oppose the
hypothesized facilitory priming effect for semantically related words. The
results of this study suggest that intentional ignoring of stimuli interferes with
sp read of activation p ro cesses.
Neill (1977; Neill & W estberry, 1987) and Lowe (1985) exam ined
inhibitory effects of ignoring in the Stroop task. Although there are several
different versions, the Stroop task usually consists of a list of five or six color
n am es printed in a differing color ink (e.g. RED printed in green ink). The
subject is required to nam e the color of ink used to print each word. Results
indicated that resp o n se times were slower when the ink color w as the
resp o n se to be ignored, the color nam e, in the previous trial than when the
ink color w as not the color nam e in the previous trial. For exam ple, in the first
trial th e word BLUE may be printed in yellow ink and in the following trial the
word GREEN may be printed in blue ink. B ecause the subject w as required
to ignore, or inhibit, the "blue" response in the first trial to give the correct
resp o n se of "yellow", responding "blue" in the following trial is slowed. It can
be said that processing and responding to "blue" in the second trial h a s been
interfered with, or inhibited.
R esearch conducted by Yee (1991) indicates that even ignored stimuli
presented outside the area of focused attention are processed and are
associated with inhibitory effects of related target stimuli. In Y ee's (1991)
study, subjects w ere required to respond to geom etric sh a p e s while words
w ere presented in the periphery a s distractors. W ords that w ere semantically
related to the distractor words w ere then presented in a lexical decision task.
Y ee found that words semantically related to words which w ere presented a s
distractors yielded slower lexical decision tim es than did words not related to
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th e distractors. It w as su g g ested that the distractor words w ere ignored,
activation w as inhibited, to facilitate responding to the geom etric sh a p e s.
The p ro cess of ignoring distractor stimuli inhibited, or interfered with, the
sp read of activation to semantically related words and resulted in slowed
lexical decision tim es. This evidence supports the notion that selective
attention d o es not eliminate th e processing of peripheral stimuli and that
inhibitory p ro c esse s are important to the focusing of attention.

Inhibition of Emotional Stimuli within a Network System
Fox (1994) investigated th e effects of this inhibitory process on emotional
information. In particular, sh e exam ined threat-related information and
grouped individuals according to state and trait anxiety. S he also defined a
unique group of individuals who scored low on anxiety but theoretically
responded to stre sso rs with high anxiety behaviorally and physiologically
(W einberger, 1990; W einberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). S he
identified this group by low sco res on the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) who w ere also
high sco rers on the Marlowe-Crowne Scale of Social Desirability (Crowne &
Marlowe, 1960). T h ese subjects were classified by W einberger (1990) and
Fox (1994) a s "repressors" (REP). Fox (1994) exam ined the interaction
betw een high anxiety, low anxiety, and REP subjects and inhibition using a
num ber identification task which displayed distractor words above and below
th e num ber and a lexical decision task which followed each num ber trial. In
so m e trials, the lexical decision task consisted of a word that w as previously
used a s a distractor word for th e previous num ber identification task.
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S h e found that REP subjects dem onstrated slower reaction tim es when
the "inhibited" word w as emotional, or threat-related, rather than
nonemotional. In addition, th e am ount of inhibition for emotional words w as
g reater for the REP group than for high anxiety or low anxiety groups. Low
anxiety subjects also dem onstrated the inhibitory effect for emotional words,
but this inhibition did not significantly differ (e<.07) from their inhibition of
nonemotional words. B ecau se of the low num ber of subjects in this study
(N=10 per group), the ability to detect "inhibition" may be limited by problems
with statistical power. B ecau se of this robust finding of slowed reaction tim es
to threat-related information, Fox su g g ests that ineffective inhibition of threatrelated information may be causally associated with an attentional bias
toward threat-related information in anxious individuals. Fox term ed this
phenom enon a s th e "defective inhibition hypothesis."
It is important to point out that in each of the above experim ents
concerning nonemotional an d emotional stimuli, inhibition w as found to
"spread" to semantically related stimuli. The inhibition of responding w as not
limited to only th e ignored word, but also affected words semantically related
to th e ignored word. Responding to stimuli semantically related to ignored or
su p p re ssed information w as inhibited. This finding cannot readily be
explained by current m odels of sem antic memory or selective attention
without modifications. Sem antic memory and selective attention m odels
have, however, successfully explained data resulting from cognitive task s
paradigm s investigating relationships betw een stimuli. O ne such paradigm
is the priming lexical decision task which is utilized in the current
investigation. The following is a review of consistently reported results for
nonem otional stimuli used within the lexical decision task paradigm.
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Lexical Decision Task and Nonemotional Stimuli
The priming lexical decision task (LDT) has been widely used in research
examining cognitive p ro cesses such a s the spread of activation, storage, and
retrieval of nonemotional information. This task has also been successfully
used to exam ine the associative networks am ong nonemotional stimuli.
B ecau se of its successful history of studying th ese phenom enon, the LDT
w as chosen a s the cognitive task for the current investigation. Both sem antic
and repetition priming tasks are used in this investigation.
The priming LDT consists of multiple trials; each trial contains two stimuli.
The first stimuli presented is th e prime and the second is the target letter
string. The procedure for each trial is a s follows. Each trial is initiated by the
presentation of a fixture point or ready signal to prepare the subject to focus
his/her attention. The fixture point is replaced by a prime which rem ains
present for a fixed duration of time. The prime is then replaced by a target
letter string. Letter strings may be words or nonwords. Nonwords are usually
pronounceable and orthographically legal. Nonwords are generally formed
by changing one letter, often a vowel (Antos, 1979; Neely, 1977). Subjects
respond to the target letter string by (a) deciding if the target is a word or
nonword and (b) indicating their decision by pressing buttons on a response
box or pressing keys on a com puter keyboard. This response com pletes one
trial of the LDT. After a brief period another trial begins. Som e researchers
have modified this procedure to investigate specific theoretical questions.
Modified procedures include differences in prime duration (Neely, 1977),
differences in the am ount of time between the onset of the prime and the
onset of th e target (Favreau & Segalowitz, 1983; Neely, 1977), the prime may
require a lexical decision to be m ade (den Heyer, Briand, & Dannenbring,
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1983), the fixture point, prime, and target m ay ap p ear simultaneously
(Seidenberg, W aters, S anders, & Langer, 1984), a s well a s others (see
Neely, 1990 for a review).
R egardless of the exact procedure, research using the LDT has
consistently indicated that when the prime and target word are semantically
related (e.g. DOCTOR-NURSE) lexical decision times to the target are faster
than when the prime and target are unrelated (e.g. BUTTER-NURSE). This
effect is known a s the facilitory sem antic priming effect, or sem antic priming.
O ther forms of sem antic priming include grammatical, syntactical, and
categorical priming. T hese forms of sem antic priming have also been found
to yield a facilitory priming effect (Neely,1990).

It is hypothesized that

activation of th e node representing the prime word sp read s to other
associatively linked nodes, regardless of how the nodes are associated. This
su b seq u en t activation lowers th e aw areness thresholds of linked nodes.
Thus if the target word is represented by an associatively linked node, its
threshold is lowered and will require fewer perceptual cu es to be activated
into aw areness. W hen the target is associatively linked to the prime, the
individual m akes a faster lexical decision than when the target is not linked to
the prime. This facilitory priming effect h as also been found for semantically
unrelated w ords which sh ared the sam e emotional valence and is referred to
a s emotional priming (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989b). The u se of emotional
w ords within a LDT paradigm, however, h as not always provided the
expected facilitory emotional and sem antic priming effect (Jackson & G eer,
1993b).
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Lexical Decision Task and Emotional Stimuli
Hill and Kemp-W heeler (1989a; 1989b; Kemp-W heeler & Hill, 1991) have
exam ined the role of aversive emotional stimuli within the LDT paradigm.
T h ese research ers com pared lexical decision tim es for emotional target
w ords primed with (a) unrelated emotional words, (b) related nonemotional
words, and (c) unrelated nonemotional words. Also com pared were
nonemotional target words primed with (a) related nonemotional words, (b)
unrelated nonemotional words, and (c) a row of X's. The LDT paradigm s
used contained both supraliminal (Hill and Kemp-W heeler, 1989b) and
subliminal (Kemp-W heeler & Hill, 1991) presentation of primes. In each of
their studies, Hill and Kemp-W heeler found evidence for both sem antic
priming and emotional priming. Sem antic priming w as described a s the
facilitation of lexical decision tim es due to the sem antic relationship betw een
th e prime and target words. Sem antic priming w as exam ined by com paring
the condition of nonemotional primes unrelated to emotional targets (e.g.
JACKET-GUILT) and the condition of nonemotional primes semantically
related to emotional targets (e.g. CHAMBER-TORTURE). Emotional priming
w as described a s the facilitation of lexical decision tim es due to the
em otional relationship of the prime and target words. Emotional priming w as
exam ined by comparing the condition of nonemotional primes unrelated to
emotional targets (e.g. JACKET-GUILT) and the condition of emotional
prim es semantically unrelated to emotional targets (e.g. DISEASEAMBUSH).
Sem antic priming is predicted by network theory and the notion of
spreading activation. When the prime word is activated, the activation
sp rea d s to associatively linked nodes. B ecause the two words are related in
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m eaning it is believed that th e target word is associatively linked to the prime
word. The subthreshold activation of the target word lowers the am ount of
activation required to bring the target word into aw areness, thus facilitory
lexical decision times. Emotional priming is predicted by Bower's theory
(1981) which su g g ests that em otions exist a s nodes. Although the emotional
prime and target words are not semantically linked nodes, they are linked to
a m ore general aversive emotion node through which activation can spread.
W hen th e prime word is activated, the activation sp read s to the general
emotion node and then sp re ad s to other nodes associatively linked to that
emotion node, regardless of th e sem antic relationship betw een the emotional
prime and target words. Hill and Kemp-W heeler (1989b) also note that
emotional priming could result from a form of sem antic priming, such a s
categorical priming, due to th e commonality of the aversive emotion betw een
th e words.
Jack so n and G eer (1993b) also exam ined the role of aversive emotional
stimuli within the LDT paradigm with the addition of a condition for
semantically related emotional prime and target words. In this study lexical
decision tim es for emotional and nonemotional target words primed with
em otional and nonemotional w ords which w ere either related or unrelated to
th e target word w ere com pared. Consistent with Hill and Kem p-W heeler's
(1989b) data, Jackson & G eer (1993b) found general evidence for sem antic
and emotional priming. Lexical decision tim es for target words w ere faster
when th e target w as primed with a semantically related word rather than an
unrelated word. Lexical decision tim es for emotional target words w ere faster
when th e target w as primed with an unrelated emotional prime rather than an
unrelated nonem otional prime.
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In contrast to th ese general findings, Jackson and G eer (1993b) found a
lack of sem antic priming w hen both the prime and target words were
emotional. This result contradicts predictions m ade by the notion of
spreading activation. S pread of activation theory predicts that lexical
decision tim es for a target (e.g. NURSE) will be faster when the target is
primed with a semantically related word (e.g. DOCTOR) in com parison to an
unrelated word (e.g. BUTTER). In Jackson and G eer's (1993b) study lexical
decision tim es w ere not faster when an emotional prime w as related, rather
than unrelated, to the emotional target. T hese results w ere explained a s
providing evidence for an inhibitory m echanism operating within a sem antic
network. It w as su g g ested that perception of emotional stimuli and activation
of emotional arousal results in an inhibition response. This inhibition
resp o n se serv es to inhibit th e emotional arousal a s well a s the m eaning
representation, or node. This inhibition then sp re a d s to associatively related
nodes. The proposed inhibitory m echanism com petes, or interferes with the
activation of the sam e nodes. The competing, or interfering, p ro cesses result
in a distinct lack of speeding for lexical decision tim es even though the prime
w as semantically related to th e target word.
The theory of an inhibitory process described by Jackson and G eer
(1993b) would also predict that the prime word which elicited the arousal and
responding inhibitory p ro cess would be inhibited and the lexical decision
tim es to emotional targets primed by them selves, a s in repetition priming,
would not receive the sam e facilitating benefits observed in repetition priming
of nonem otional stimuli. The repetition priming LDT paradigm com pares
conditions in which the target word (e.g. NURSE) is primed by the sa m e word
(e.g. NURSE) com pared to th e condition in which the target word
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(e.g. NURSE) is primed by a different unrelated word (e.g. BUTTER). The
facilitory priming effect in the repetition priming LDT refers to the d e c re a se in
lexical decision time due to the u se of the target word a s the prime. Similar to
th e priming LDT paradigm, repetition priming h as been widely used to study
cognitive processing of nonemotional information.

Repetition Priming with Nonemotional Stimuli
Several variations of the repetition priming task have been designed that
exam ine the cognitive processing of nonemotional information. W ords m ay
be rep eated throughout a single experim ent to exam ine inter-item lag upon
memory (e.g. Karayanidis, Andrews, Ward, & McConaghy, 1991) or identical
words may be used a s both th e prime and target word (e.g. Forster & Davis,
1984). The current investigation utilizes the latter paradigm. Identical words,
therefore identical m eanings, will be used a s both the prime and target
stimuli. Facilitation of lexical decision time occurs when a target word is
primed with the identical word rather than a different word. R esearchers
have hypothesized that this facilitory priming effect results from enhanced
lexical a c c e s s and/or episodic memory (Forster & Davis, 1984; Jacoby, 1983;
Karayanidis et al., 1991; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979).
Enhanced lexical a c c e ss refers to the process of activating the prime word
which lowers the aw aren ess threshold for subsequent presentations of the
sam e word a s a target, thus facilitating responding to the target. Episodic
memory refers to the existence of a memory trace of the prime word which is
re-activated by the presentation of the target word, thus facilitating
responding to the target. R ecent evidence indicates that both enhanced
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lexical a c c e s s and episodic memory p ro cesses operate in the repetition
priming effect (Karayanidis et al., 1991).
Previous research h as not exam ined the utility of the repetition paradigm
for investigating cognitive processing of emotional information. It is unclear if
th e inhibition of responding also occurs in repetition priming of emotional
stimuli. It ap p ears that the repetition priming task serv es a s a more stringent
test of possible inhibitory m echanism s for two specific reasons. First,
b ec a u se th e sem antic relationship between the prime and target is
unam biguous, th e words are identical, the sem antic relationship betw een
them is a s simple a s possible w hereas in a non-repetition LDT, the sem antic
relationship betw een the prime and target is more complex. Thus, the
processing of emotional and nonemotional information can be exam ined in
th e repetition priming paradigm with less confounding information than in the
non-repetition LDT. Second, any inhibitory m echanism m ust override
facilitation of responding that occurs a s a result of en h an ced lexical a c c e s s
and/or episodic memory in th e repetition priming task.
The repetition priming paradigm also allows the examination of individual
differences in responding to emotional and nonemotional information and the
inhibition of emotional stimuli within a network system . In particular,
individual differences of state and trait anxiety which have th e potential of
effecting an inhibitory m echanism can be exam ined in this paradigm. Since
the sa m e individual differences may also effect motor resp o n se tim es
(Jackson & G eer, 1993a) and may lead to erroneous interpretation of
individual differences in cognitive response times, a brief discussion of this
topic follows.
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Individual Differences in Motor Movement
S tate and trait anxiety have been hypothesized to be individual
differences which may account for variance in the cognitive processing of
emotional information (Williams et al., 1988). It is hypothesized that state and
trait anxiety may affect lexical decision tim es for emotional stimuli and
inhibition of priming. Results from the priming lexical decision task, however,
reflect more than cognitive processing of information. R esponse tim es for the
LDT are com prised of cognitive reaction tim es a s well a s motor m ovem ent
tim es. To attribute differences in cognitive processing to individual
differences it m ust be assu m ed that the motor movement tim es do not also
vary due to the individual differences. If motor movement varies a s a function
of th e individual differences it may confound the results observed in the
cognitive task.
Jackson and G eer (1993a) found that state and trait anxiety varied
system atically with motor movement times. The motor task in this study
involved executing the exact response, pressing a key on a keyboard, used
for the LDT. Individuals with low state and low trait anxiety responded to the
motor task faster than subjects with high state/low trait, low state/high trait, or
high state/high trait anxiety. T h ese results suggest the need to partial motor
task tim es from the cognitive task prior to examining the effects of individuals
differences, such a s state and trait anxiety, upon cognitive processing.
current study em ploys this strategy to replicate and extend the various
research suggesting the need for such controls.

The
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Motor Task
Many theorists have exam ined the interaction betw een individual
differences in anxiety and perform ance on motor tasks. T hese theories,
however, tend to include a variety of term s which are then generalized to
other, nonequivalent terms. Before reviewing theories concerning the effects
of anxiety upon cognitive and motor perform ance it is n ecessary to briefly
exam ine th e definitions of commonly used term s. The following discussion
outlines th e u sag e of th ese term s in respect to the current investigation.

S tre ss
McGrath (1970) h as described stre ss a s an im balance betw een the
dem and of a situation and the capability of the individual. This dem and can
either be greater than capability, a s in overload, or less than capability, a s in
underload. Borrowing from M cGrath's definition, physiological and
psychological stress may be differentiated. Physiological stre ss is described
a s an im balance betw een physiological capability and dem and. Injury,
illness, and physical fatigue are perhaps the m ost common catalysts for
physiological stress. In com parison, psychological stre ss is described a s an
im balance betw een psychological capability and dem and. Mood state,
num ber of perceived stressors, and mental fatigue are perhaps the m ost
com m on catalysts for psychological stress. In general, stress d o es not
require th e perception of dem and, the perception of capability, or the
perception of an im balance betw een the two. If however the dem and,
capability, or im balance are perceived, it is implied that the individual h as
m ade an accurate a sse ssm e n t of th e se features.
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Anxiety
In contrast to stress, anxiety requires and results from perceptions of
dem and, perceptions of capability, perceptions of the im balance betw een the
two, or any combination of th e se three. Two com ponents differentiate stress
and anxiety. First is the accuracy of the perceived im balance betw een
dem and and capability. Specifically, anxiety can result from inaccurate
perceptions. Inaccurate perceptions may be b ased upon either am biguous
stimuli or misinterpretations of stimuli. Second, anxiety can result from a
singular form of im balance betw een dem and and capability: dem and is
perceived a s greater than capability.

S tate and trait anxiety.
Anxiety is often viewed a s existing a s a state or trait of an individual.
Spielberger (1966) conceptualized state anxiety a s an emotional sta te of
apprehension and tension asso ciated with autonom ic arousal. S tate anxiety
is believed to be a transient form of anxiety that is responsive to situational
stimuli. Spielberger conceptualized trait anxiety a s a tendency to perceive
stimuli a s threatening and respond with state anxiety. Individuals high in trait
anxiety display high state anxiety more often than individuals low in trait
anxiety. Trait anxiety d o es not necessarily suggest an underlying, constant
level of anxiety, but rather a tendency to perceive stimuli either a s an social
or physical threat, resulting in state anxiety.

Som atic and cognitive anxiety.
Both state and trait anxiety can be further classified into som atic and
cognitive anxiety (Martens, Vealey, and Burton, 1990). Som atic anxiety

25

refers to the physiological a sp e c ts of anxiety. Specifically, effects of
autonom ic arousal asso ciated with the experience of anxiety are classified a s
som atic anxiety. T h ese effects include increased heart rate, dizziness,
n au sea, m uscle tension, and sweating. Cognitive anxiety refers to the covert
a sp e c ts of anxiety. Worry, aversive feelings, and increased m isperceptions
of external and internal stimuli are included a s covert, or cognitive, aspects.
Som atic and cognitive anxiety are believed to function independently
although they covary (Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981). Most individuals
experience both som atic and cognitive anxiety, although one type may
rep resen t a dom inant pattern of responding. Neiss (1988; 1990) su g g ests
that the dom inant anxiety resp o n se differs across situations and across
individuals. It is also possible that som e individuals experience more of one
type of anxiety than the other. Individual differences in som atic and cognitive
anxiety may have implications for theories concerning anxiety and
perform ance which will be discu ssed later.

Clinical Anxiety
Clinical anxiety refers to anxiety which is excessive and interferes with an
individual's ability to function. Use of the term "clinical" implies a disorder
which is diagnosable and presum ably treatable. A disorder is, by nature,
dysfunctional. Although m ost individuals experience tem porary stre ss and
even anxiety, clinical anxiety d en o tes a pervasive pattern of responding
which hinders functioning. Cognitive-behavioral treatm ent of clinical anxiety
includes topics such a s thought monitoring, exposure treatm ent, and anxiety
monitoring w hereas treatm ent for stress, often referred to a s stress
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m anagem ent, m ay include topics such a s time m anagem ent, relaxation, goal
setting, and communication training.

Arousal
M artens et al. (1990) describe arousal a s a state of being activated or
prepared to act and believe arousal to exist along a continuum betw een
d eep sleep and intense excitement. Arousal h as often been used
synonymously with psychological sta te s such a s anxiety. A review of
research conducted by Neiss (1988; 1990) however, did not support the
synonym ous u sag e of arousal and anxiety. Although arousal is associated
with th e experience of anxiety, arousal may also be experienced with a
variety of other em otions such a s happiness or anger. The current
discussion attem pts to avoid th e syntactic error of using arousal and anxiety
synonym ously by dividing arousal into physiological and psychological
com ponents.
Physiological arousal refers to autonomic nervous system (ANS) arousal.
Sym ptom s of ANS arousal include increased heart rate, sweating, and
constriction of blood vessels, a s well a s others. T hese sym ptom s are
believed to prepare the individual for physical action. This preparation for
action is exemplified in a "fight or flight" instinct. In anxiety, physiological
arousal is referred to a s som atic anxiety. Psychological arousal, also
described a s emotional arousal, refers to the preparation of mental, or
cognitive, abilities to act. Sym ptoms of the activation of mental abilities
include increased vigilance to emotional stimuli and emotional lability. In
anxiety, psychological arousal is referred to a s cognitive anxiety.
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The relation betw een arousal and cognition h as long been d eb ated and
rem ains unclear. R esearch ers have m ade em phatic claims concerning this
relationship. Lazarus (1984) su g g ests that cognition p reced es emotional
arousal w hereas Zajonc (1984) su g g ests that arousal preced es the
perception of emotion. The current discussion ex p resses the view that
perception is a result of a complex physiological system . Within this system ,
psychological emotional arousal may result from interpretation of external or
internal cues. Physiological arousal may serve a s an internal cue for
psychological emotional arousal. The current discussion e x p resses the view
that both psychological and physiological arousal are physiological in nature,
i.e. result from biological functioning, and are not necessarily m ediated by
aw aren ess. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the term arousal will be used
in this discussion to refer to physiological arousal. This arousal can be
asso ciated with stre ss or anxiety.

M ovement
Movement can be classified in a variety of ways. Most useful for the
current discussion is the classification of fine and gross motor m ovem ent.
Fine motor movem ent is described a s m ovem ent requiring small m uscle
control and precision. Typing, handwriting, and threading a needle are
exam ples of fine motor m ovem ents. In comparison, gross motor m ovem ents
require large m uscles and coordination. Kicking a ball, running, and jumping
are exam ples of gross motor m ovements.
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Perform ance
Perform ance on task s is usually m easured by resp o n se tim es, su c c e ss of
ta sk completion, or both. The current discussion is concerned with response
tim es and investigation of cognitive perform ance in com parison with motor
perform ance rather than su c c e ss of task completion. R esponse tim es are
com prised of reaction tim es and movem ent times. Reaction tim es refer to the
time betw een presentation of th e task stimuli and initiation of m ovem ent.
Reaction tim es are com prised of premotor reaction tim es and motor reaction
tim es. Prem otor reaction tim es refer to the time betw een presentation of task
stimuli and electromyographic (EMG) ch an g es w hereas motor reaction tim es
refer to th e time betw een EMG changes and initiation of movement.
M ovement tim es refer to the time betw een initiation of m ovem ent and
completion of the task.
Perform ance is divided into motor perform ance and cognitive
perform ance. Motor perform ance is readily exam ined in m ovem ent times.
Most likely, however, cognition also occurs during this time and serv es to
evaluate and revise m ovem ent if necessary. The cognitive processing
involved in movement tim es is reduced for simple task s which require few
m ovem ents. Cognitive perform ance is evidenced in the reaction time portion
of resp o n se times. Determining reaction tim es is som ew hat elusive due to
the necessity of motor movem ent for the recording of a reaction time. The
u se of a task requiring the sam e m ovem ent a s the lexical decision task but
requiring a s little cognitive processing a s possible allows for the recording of
a resp o n se time which can be regarded a s m ovem ent time. This m ovem ent
time can then be partialled from response tim es of task s requiring greater

29

cognitive processing to allow exam ination of cognitive perform ance less
confounded by m ovement.
S uccessful task perform ance is affected by many variables such a s stress,
anxiety, arousal, the motor m ovem ent required by the task, and the task
complexity. The combination of th e se variables can improve or hinder
perform ance. The following discussion highlights theories concerning
anxiety and perform ance.

Theories Concerning Arousal. Anxiety, and Perform ance
Two of the m ost popular theories describing the relationship betw een
arousal, anxiety, and perform ance are drive theory and the inverted-U
hypothesis. More recently, cognitive theories, a catastrophe model, and
K rane's (1992) model have been proposed to explain this relationship. The
drive theory w as initially proposed by Hull (1943) and later adapted by
S p en ce and S p en ce (1966) to describe the relationship betw een arousal
and perform ance. It w as b ased upon the equation: Perform ance = Habit
Strength x Drive. Drive theory proposes that increases in arousal are
asso ciated with poor perform ance for novel, complex task s and are
asso ciated with good perform ance for simple, overlearned tasks. R egardless
of task type, th e se relationships are believed to be linear. In a review of
relevant research, M artens (1974) found little support for this theory. He
com m ented that drive theory d o es not incorporate cognitive processing
which is an important perform ance variable. O ther research ers have
criticized drive theory's inability to accurately predict perform ance and its
disregard for individual differences (e.g. W einberg, 1979).
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In contrast to drive theory, a non-linear relationship betw een anxiety and
perform ance h as been suggested. The inverted-U hypothesis w as originated
by Y erkes and Dodson (1908) to describe the relationship betw een arousal
and perform ance. This hypothesis, commonly known a s the Y erkes-Dodson
law, h a s been revised to describe anxiety and perform ance and proposes
that b est perform ance is asso ciated with an optimal level of anxiety. For each
individual, each task h as an asso ciated optimal level of anxiety and
perform ance is impaired if anxiety is too low or too high. It is believed that
this optimal level of anxiety varies according to task complexity and
familiarity. The optimal level is higher for simple, overleam ed task s and
lower for complex, novel tasks. Most research in this a re a h a s utilized an
induction of state anxiety such a s being told of failure or threat of shock.
Results indicate that only anxiety induced by ego-threat (failure), rather than
physical threat, consistently affects perform ance (Eysenck, 1983). Som e
research ers also note that m easurem ents of arousal do not correlate with
self-reported anxiety (Holyrod, W estbrook, Wolf, & Badhorn, 1978).
N eiss (1988; 1990) claims that the inverted-U hypothesis h a s little utility
a s a theory b ecau se it cannot be refuted. If different motor behaviors have
different optimal levels of anxiety for best perform ance, a s the inverted-U
theory sug g ests, nonsignificant research can be explained by claiming that
anxiety levels that w ere too low or too high to detect the inverted-U pattern of
responding. Neiss also concludes that m ost research supports a
correlational, but not causal, inverted-U relationship betw een anxiety and
perform ance. Landers (1980) noted that the inveried-U hypothesis simply
d escrib es a relationship betw een anxiety and perform ance without
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hypothesizing why the relationship exists. Several other theories have been
proposed to explain the relationship.
After observing the relationship betw een anxiety and perform ance, a
cognitive theory of why the relationship exists becam e prominent; one such
theory w as derived by W einer (1965; 1966; W einer & Schneider, 1971).
Although he attem pted to explain the relationship hypothesized in drive
theory, his ideas are present in current theories. He proposed that
perform ance is due to th e attributions of su c c e ss e s and failures. In drive
theory, better perform ance is predicted for complex, novel task s with low
anxiety states. W einer proposed that m ore failures w ere likely with complex,
novel ta sk s and high anxiety sta te s would increase negative attributions for
th e failure. T hese negative attributions would impair perform ance. For
simple, overleam ed tasks, however, high anxiety sta te s are beneficial.
T h e se task s produce less failures and less opportunity for negative
attributions which could impair performance. W einer further su g g ested that
individuals had a predisposition to high or low anxiety sta te s and that this
predisposition would affect their attributional style. High anxious individuals,
in com parison to low anxious individuals, w ere hypothesized to have
impaired perform ance under high state anxiety situations. The impaired
perform ance w as believed to be due to the predisposition of high anxious
individuals to m ake negative attributions.
Wine (1971) derived a similar theory to explain the results of the invertedU hypothesis. He also believed that individuals predisposed to high or low
anxiety required different state anxiety levels for optimal perform ance. He
proposed that low anxious individuals concentrate on task-relevant stimuli
and perform well during high sta te anxiety. High anxious individuals
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concentrated on task-irrelevant stimuli, such a s self-deprecatory thoughts,
and performed poorly during high state anxiety. While during low state
anxiety, low anxiety individuals becam e "bored", concentrated on taskirrelevant stimuli and performed poorly although they could be motivated to
improve perform ance. High anxiety individuals during low sta te anxiety were
able to concentrate on task-relevant stimuli and performed well. Specifically,
perform ance could be hindered by concentration on task-irrelevant stimuli.
Wine also noted that high anxious individuals were affected by threat of
failure, ego-threat, rather than physical threat. When high anxiety state is
induced by threat of physical harm, a s in threat of shock, individuals did not
show impaired perform ance (Morris & Liebert, 1973).
Eysenck (1983) h as com m ented that th e se cognitive theories do not have
compelling experim ental evidence to support their hypotheses. Although
they do predict the observed inverted-U response outcome, other hypotheses
generated by the theory have not been supported. In particular, th ese
theories do not account for evidence that som e anxiety can improve
perform ance. A theory derived by Easterbrook (1959) d o es hypothesize the
possible beneficial effects of anxiety upon performance. Easterbrook's
theory proposes that anxiety produces a restriction in the range of
environmental c u es which are cognitively processed. Increasing anxiety
level to an optimal am ount may restrict environmental cu es to allow only
n ecessary processing and optimal u se of attention. Lower levels of anxiety
are associated with not enough restriction of environmental cu e s and too
much irrelevant information is p rocessed which impairs perform ance. Higher
levels of anxiety are associated with a restriction of too many cues, such that
som e vital c u es may not be processed, and impaired perform ance results.
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He predicted that an optimal, intermediate, level of anxiety would produce
optimal perform ance; he predicted an inverted-U relationship betw een
anxiety and perform ance.
A m ore recent theory concerning attention, anxiety, and perform ance w as
derived by Kahnem an (1973). Kahnem an proposes that anxiety is
asso ciated with task irrelevant stimuli, such a s worry, which tak es attentionalprocessing capability aw ay from the relevant task. He su g g ests that
individuals respond to, or com pensate for, the d ecrease in task relevant
processing with increased effort. During high anxiety states, perform ance is
related to the am ount of effort given to processing task-relevant information.
If th e individual is unable to com pensate for the d ecreased processing
capability, perform ance will suffer. Kahnem an su g g ests that available
attentional capacity varies according to the task being completed. This
variable capacity is d ecreased by arousal and increased by effort. Evidence
for a variable available attentional capacity h as com e from research involving
digit-span memory. Digit-span memory is believed to index working memory,
or attentional capacity (Baddely & Hitch, 1974). Under high state anxiety
conditions, digit span d e c re a se s (see Eysenck 1977; 1981 for review). This
result is taken a s evidence that attentional capacity d e c re a se s during high
sta te anxiety. It is also possible, however, that attentional capacity rem ains
the sam e while attentional processing is directed at task-irrelevant stimuli
such a s internal and external c u es relevant to the anxiety stimuli. Less
attentional capability is directed at task-relevant stimuli but the capacity
rem ains constant. Both theories predict poorer digit-span perform ance
during high state anxiety.
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Recently, other theories have been hypothesized to describe the
relationship betw een anxiety and cognitive, motor, and/or athletic
perform ance (Krane, 1992). Most researchers, however, recognize a
correlational, inverted-U relationship betw een anxiety and perform ance
(Neiss, 1988). Many interpretations are offered to explain why this
relationship exists. Although none of the explanatory theories are universally
accepted, th e facilitation of research h as increased understanding of the
relationship betw een anxiety and performance. In particular, research h as
consistently indicated that individual characteristics, such a s trait anxiety,
interact with state anxiety to affect performance. The current investigation
exam ines this interaction and its affect upon both cognitive and motor
perform ance in a repetition priming lexical decision task.

Rationale and H ypotheses
Rationale
Jackson & G eer's (1993b) research examining aversive emotional
information in an LDT su g g ests that a m echanism operates to inhibit, or
interfere with, the facilitory priming effect of semantically related emotional
prime and target words (e.g. KILL-DEAD). The hypothesized inhibition, or
interference, sp read s from the node representing the prime stimuli (e.g. KILL)
to the node representing the target stimuli (e.g. DEAD). The current
investigation proposed a replication of this effect a s well a s a more direct
exam ination of the potential inhibitory mechanism. To replicate and extend
th e earlier research the original priming lexical decision task and a repetition
priming task are employed. By utilizing a repetition priming task, facilitory
priming can be exam ined without being confounded by the complexities of
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sem antic relationships betw een prime and target words. Using the identical
word a s both prime and target (e.g. DEAD-DEAD) allows direct exam ination
of hypothesized inhibitory effects upon the originally activated prime node.
The effects of individual differences in state and trait anxiety upon this
inhibitory m echanism are also examined.
There are five specific purposes of this study. First, this study investigates
th e cognitive processing of aversive emotional information within a priming
lexical decision task (LDT) paradigm to replicate prior findings by Jackson
and G eer (1993b). Second, this study extends th e se prior findings by further
investigating a possible inhibitory m echanism by using a repetition priming
LDT paradigm. Third, this study investigates the relationship betw een
individual differences of state and trait anxiety and patterns of responding to
th e priming task. Fourth, this study exam ines individual differences of state
and trait anxiety in motor response times. B ecause we exam ine the cognitive
processing of aversive emotional information, individual differences in motor
resp o n se tim es are partialled out from the total reaction time to reveal a more
accu rate cognitive decision time. Finally, this study exam ines differential
responding of high and low anxious individuals to social and physical threatrelated emotional targets.
To accomplish th e se five purposes, the current investigation utilizes the
priming lexical decision task and a num ber recognition task. The network
system is em ployed a s a framework to benefit the understanding of
representations, storage, and retrieval of information. The LDT paradigm
allows research ers to exam ine the resp o n ses to a target word when the
target is primed with the sam e word, a semantically related word, a different
nonem otional word, or a different emotional word.
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Of interest to the cognitive task of this study are situations in which the
facilitory priming effect is expected to occur but d o es not. Inhibitory
pro cesses, a s described earlier, are said to occur in th e se situations. The
facilitory priming, or th e facilitation due to priming, refers to the d e c re a se in
resp o n se time from when the target word is primed with an unrelated word to
when the target word is primed with the sam e or a semantically related word.
This study com pares the facilitory priming for emotional stimuli to the facilitory
priming for nonem otional priming.
If an inhibitory m echanism o perates within a network system to inhibit
responding to emotional stimuli, the facilitory priming effect for emotional
stimuli should not be a s great a s the facilitory priming effect for nonemotional
stimuli. In fact, this priming lexical decision task directly te sts the notion of
inhibition observed by Jackson and G eer (1993b). In that research, inhibition
w as observed for semantically related emotional stimuli. It is also su g g ested
that the capability of the inhibition m echanism may vary a s a function of
individual differences such a s state and trait anxiety. R esearch indicates that
individuals with high levels of state and trait anxiety may selectively attend to
negative emotional information (Williams et al., 1988). This hypervigilance
m ay be asso ciated with d ecreased inhibitory p ro cesses (Fox 1994; Jackson
and G eer, 1993b).
B ecau se sta te and trait anxiety is being exam ined a s individual
differences, it is important to exam ine the effects of state and trait anxiety
upon motor functioning. Cognitive task s usually require motor resp o n ses a s
indicators of cognitive ability. Anxiety h as been reported to affect motor
perform ance and may confound results from cognitive task s (Jackson & G eer,
1993a). Although it w as hoped that random assignm ent of subjects and the
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notion of ch an ce would prevent motor responding from confounding results
from this cognitive task, the current study exam ined this issue and used motor
responding a s a covariate in analyses.
The interaction betw een threat type (social and physical) and anxiety
level is also exam ined. Fox (1993b; 1994) has suggested that social threat
would be of greater emotional concern than physical threat for individuals
scoring high on th e STAI. This study exam ines general resp o n ses to threat
type and investigates possible differences in responding asso ciated with
varying levels of anxiety.
The design of the study involved a 2 x 4 within subjects variation of target
word emotionality (emotional, nonemotional), and the relationship betw een
th e prime and target words (emotional prime unrelated to target [e.g.
STUPID-BEATEN], nonemotional prime unrelated to target [e.g. CRADLEBEATEN], prime related to target [e.g. ABUSED-BEATEN], and prime
identical to target [e.g. BEATEN-BEATEN]). All analyses involved response
tim es a s the dependent variable. Subjects were placed into high or low state
and trait anxiety groups according to scores on the Spielberger State-Trait
Inventory (STAI). Although it would have been most preferable to have
exam ined the interaction of th e se groups and responding i n a 2 x 2 x 2 x 4
(state anxiety X trait anxiety X target emotionality X relationship betw een the
words) mixed model, th e low num ber of subjects comprising the high state
anxiety/low trait anxiety and low state anxiety/high trait anxiety groups w as
too low to warrant this analysis. Instead, data w as exam ined in se p a ra te 2 x
2 x 4 (anxiety level X target emotionality X relationship betw een the words)
analyses. This form of analysis also allows for investigation of the
conceptually different constructs of state and trait anxiety. Although th e se
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constructs are believed to be highly correlated, they are believed to m easure
unique concepts of transient and long-standing characteristics. Results from
the motor task serve a s covariates for analyses of results from the cognitive
task. In addition to examination of th ese overall responding effects, the
following hypotheses w ere exam ined.

H ypotheses
H ypothesis 1.
It is hypothesized that target words primed with the sam e word (e.g.
jacket-JACKET) will yield faster response times than target words primed with
an unrelated word (e.g. signal-JACKET). This hypothesis results from
research documenting a facilitory effect for repetition priming (se e Jordan,
1986 for a review).

Hypothesis 2.
It is hypothesized that target words primed with a related word (e.g.
blazer-JACKET) will yield faster response tim es than target w ords primed
with an unrelated word (e.g. signal-JACKET). This hypothesis results from
research documenting a facilitory effect for sem antic/related priming (see
Neely, 1990 for a review).

H ypothesis 3.
It is hypothesized that emotional targets primed with different, unrelated
emotional words (e.g. prison-CANCER) will yield faster response tim es than
emotional targets primed with different, unrelated nonemotional w ords (e.g.
mirror-CANCER). This hypothesis is based upon the emotional priming effect
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found by both Hill and Kemp-W heeler (1989b; Kemp-W heeler & Hill, 1991)
and Jackson and G eer (1993b).

H ypothesis 4.
It is hypothesized that th e am ount of facilitation betw een nonemotional
target w ords primed with the sam e word (e.g. eagle-EAGLE) and target
words primed with different, unrelated nonemotional words (e.g. onionEAGLE) will be greater than the am ount of facilitation betw een emotional
target words primed with the sam e word (e.g. fatal-FATAL) and target words
primed with unrelated emotional words (e.g. cruel-FATAL).
This com parison includes emotional targets primed with unrelated
emotional words (e.g. cruel-FATAL) rather than nonemotional words (e.g.
onion-FATAL) due to hypothesized emotional priming effects dem onstrated
by Hill and Kemp-W heeler (1989b) and Jackson and G eer (1993b). T hese
hypothesized emotional priming effects may ex aggerate repetition priming
effects. The current hypothesis is intended to focus upon repetition priming
effects without the effects of emotional priming. Hypothesis four is derived
from previous research indicating an inhibitory effect on lexical decision
tim es for emotional target words primed with related emotional words
(Jackson & G eer, 1993b).

Hypothesis 5.
It is hypothesized that the amount of facilitation betw een nonemotional
target words primed with related words (e.g. talon-EAGLE) and target words
primed with different, unrelated nonemotional words (e.g. onion-EAGLE) will
be greater than the am ount of facilitation betw een emotional target words
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primed with related words (e.g. toxic-FATAL) and target words primed with
unrelated emotional words (e.g. cruel-FATAL). This hypothesis is also
derived from previous research indicating an inhibitory effect lexical decision
tim es for emotional target w ords primed with related emotional words
(Jackson & G eer, 1993b).

H ypothesis 6.
It is hypothesized that individual differences in state and trait anxiety will
account for a significant am ount of the variance in cognitive responding to
both em otional and nonemotional target words. Individual differences in
sta te and trait anxiety w ere not found to account for a significant am ount of
variance in Jackson & G eer's (1993b) study. This lack of significance
o p p o ses a variety of research which su g g ests that individuals with high in
sta te and trait anxiety exhibit increased attention toward aversive emotional
stimuli (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg,
Mathews, Eysenck, & May, 1991; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). It is
hypothesized that individuals high in state and trait anxiety will exhibit a
d e cre ase d inhibition of emotional stimuli in com parison to individuals low in
sta te and trait anxiety. A lack of inhibition for high anxiety individuals may
result in increased attention toward aversive emotional stimuli.

H ypothesis 7.
It is hypothesized that motor response tim es will vary a s a function of state
and trait anxiety individual differences. This hypothesis is derived from
previous research of Jackson and G eer (1993a) indicating that motor
responding in a num ber recognition task varied a s a function of state and trait
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anxiety. By partialling out motor response times, m ore accurate cognitive
resp o n se tim es may be exam ined.

H ypothesis 8.
It w as hypothesized that low anxiety subjects would respond slow er to
social threat than physical threat stimuli. It w as also hypothesized that high
anxiety subjects would respond faster to social threat than physical threat
stimuli. T h e se hypotheses w ere derived from theories concerning the
inhibition of threat-related stimuli for low anxious individuals and the
attentional bias toward threat-related stimuli for high anxious individuals.
Previous research su g g ests that individuals differentially respond to threatrelated stimuli which is personally relevant or concerning (Eysenck, Mogg,
May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Mathews & Klug, 1993). B ecause it h as
b een su g g ested that th e STAI, th e current index of anxiety, m easu res
concerns of social threat, it is hypothesized that any facilitation or inhibition
for high or low anxious subjects will m ost effect responding to social threat
target words.

METHODOLOGY
S ubjects
Ninety-four undergraduate students served a s subjects in this study.
S ubjects w ere recruited from undergraduate psychology co u rses and
received extra credit for their participation. All subjects w ere fully informed of
th e requirem ents of participation in the study and their involvement w as
strictly on a volunteer basis. Subjects w ere randomly assigned to one of the
four versions of the experiment. For analysis of state and trait anxiety
interactions, subjects w ere placed into high and low anxiety groups. Thirtyo n e subjects scored below 32 on the state anxiety scale of the STAI and
w ere classified in th e low state anxiety group. Twenty-eight subjects scored
above 39 on the sta te anxiety scale and were classified in the high state
anxiety group. Thirty-three subjects scored below 32 on the trait anxiety
scale to form the low trait anxiety group while 26 subject scored above 39 to
form th e high trait anxiety group. T hese scores represent a cut-off of above
53-54 t-score for high anxiety and below 46 t-score for low anxiety. S tate and
trait anxiety sco res w ere significantly correlated (r = .66, g <.0001)
D em ographic information is presented in Table 1.

Materials
The lexical decision and num ber recognition task s w ere presented on
a com puter screen utilizing th e Micro Experimental Lab (MEL) program. The
lexical decision priming task consisted of 384 prime-target pairs. Of th e se
384 pairs, 96 pairs had an emotional target word, 96 pairs had a
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Table 1
Demographic Information
State Anxiety
Overall
X

Low

High

Trait Anxiety
Low

High

X

X

X

X

N

94

31

28

33

26

ag e

21.29

21.09

21.71

20.54

21.42

S tate
anxiety
score

35.98

28.93

42.57

26.30

49.92

Trait
anxiety
score

38.27

27.68

49.08

32.03

47.38

44

nonem otional target word, and the remaining 192 pairs had a nonword
target. The set of 96 pairs with an emotional target consisted of 24 emotional
target words primed by (a) the sam e word, (b) a related emotional word,
(c) an unrelated emotional word, or (d) an unrelated nonemotional word. The
se t of 96 pairs with a nonemotional target consisted of 24 nonemotional
target words primed by (a) th e sam e word, (b) a related nonemotional word,
(c) an unrelated nonemotional word, or (d) an unrelated emotional word. The
se t of 192 pairs with a nonword target consisted of 64 nonword targets
primed by (a) th e sam e nonword, (b) an emotional word, or (c) a
nonem otional word.
Four different forms, or versions, of this task were used so that subjects
responded to each target word only once. Each version consisted of 96
trials: 24 with emotional targets, 24 with nonemotional targets, and 48 with
nonword targets. This methodology w as chosen to (a) eliminate possible
practice effects occurring from responding to the sam e target word m ore than
once and (b) utilize the sam e target words for com parison of repetition
priming and emotional priming. Versions of the task w ere randomly assigned
and d ata from each version w as combined for analysis. Target words and
target nonwords w ere presented in upper c a s e letters while prim es were
p resented in lower c a se letters to reduce the effects of episodic memory a s
described by Neely (1990).
The num ber recognition task served a s the motor m ovem ent task for the
current investigation. This task w as also presented on a com puter screen
utilizing th e MEL program. The MEL program recorded both reaction time
and accuracy d ata for each subject. Inaccurate resp o n ses are not included
in analyses. The task w as com prised of 80 trials; 40 trials presenting the
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num ber 1 a s a target, 40 trials presenting the num ber 2 a s a target. Subjects
responded to the 80 trials by pressing corresponding keys (1 or 2) on a
com puter keyboard. The keys pressed were identical to th o se pressed
during the repetition priming trials. The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970) w as used to a s s e s s state and trait
anxiety.

Procedure for Obtaining W ords
A list of 360 words w as constructed from lists used in previous studies
investigating cognition and emotion (Gotlib & C ane, 1987; Gotlib,
MacLachlan, & Katz, 1988; Jackson & Geer, 1993b; John, 1988). W ords
w ere chosen for this list b ased on their previous u se a s either aversive
emotional or nonemotional stimuli. This list w as divided into sm aller lists
which w ere presented to pilot subjects in a paper and pencil format. Each
word w as rated by at least 50 subjects and som e words w ere rated by a s
m any a s 150 subjects. Pilot subjects were asked to rate each word for
negative, positive, or neutral emotional value. The scale used w as a s
follows:

-3

-2

extremely negative

-1

0
neutral

+1

+2

+3

extremely positive

Subjects w ere informed that th e list contained a variety of emotional and
nonem otional words. Subjects w ere asked to disregard personal preference
for other word characteristics (e.g. how pleasant the word sounds). Mean
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ratings for aversive emotional and nonemotional target words used in this
study are presented in Appendix A.
A sep a rate set of pilot subjects w ere asked to rate the sam e 360 words for
familiarity. Although frequency ratings are often used in cognition and
emotion research, familiarity ratings, how familiar the word is to subjects,
yield higher correlations with response tim es in lexical a c c e s s research
(Connine, Mullenix, Shernoff, & Yelen, 1990). Pilot subjects w ere ask ed to
recall how often they s e e or h ear each word. Each word w as rated by 200
subjects. The scale used w as a s follows:

1

2

3

4

not familiar at all

5

familiar

6

7

extremely familiar

S ets of target words were equated for word familiarity, word length, and
num ber of syllables. S ets of prime words used with target words w ere also
equated for word familiarity, word length, and num ber of syllables. T h ese
s e ts are presented in Appendix B.
A sep arate set of pilot subjects w ere asked to rate the association
betw een 148 se ts of words. T h ese ratings w ere then equated for each
condition of emotional and nonemotional targets and the highest associated
pairs w ere accepted into the study. The selected pairs of words, along with
their rated level of association are presented in Appendix C. The scale used
w as a s follows:
1

2

not associated at all

3

4
associated

5

6

7

extremely associated

47

P rocedure
After being given a brief description of the experim ent subjects w ere
a sk ed to sign th e informed consent form. Subjects w ere then asked to
com plete the STAI (Appendix D for exem plars). Subjects w ere then seated
in front of a com puter terminal and asked to read the instructions for the
experim ent which w as displayed on the com puter screen. Subjects w ere
given 10 practice num ber recognition trials and 30 practice word recognition
trails to acquaint them with th e tasks. Breaks w ere initiated by the com puter
program betw een s e ts of word and num ber trials. Subjects w ere allowed to
term inate the breaks by pressing a sp ace bar to continue the experim ent.
P ractice trials w ere followed by instructions informing th e subject that
experim ental trials would com m ence. Subjects w ere given 40 num ber
recognition trials, a break, 48 word recognition trials, a break, 40 num ber
recognition trials, a break, and 48 sep arate word recognition trials.
In the word recognition task, each trial began with a 100 m s presentation
of an attention-capturing plus sign. A prime word, presented in low er-case
letters, then replaced the plus sign and rem ained on the screen for 300 ms.
A blank screen ap p eared for 100 m s followed by the presentation of the
target letter string, presented in upper-case letters. The subject then decided
if th e letter string w as or w as not a word in the English language and
responded by pressing keys on the com puter keyboard. The subject w as
instructed to p ress "1" if the letter string w as a word and a "2" if the letter string
w as not a word. O nce the subject responded, the screen becam e blank for
500 m s. This pro cess w as repeated for every word recognition trial.
In th e num ber recognition task, each trial began with a 100 ms
presentation of an attention-capturing plus sign. A row of 5 X's replaced the
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plus sign and rem ained on the screen for 300 ms. A blank screen appeared
for 100 m s followed by th e presentation of the target number. The subject
then decided if the target num ber w as a 1 or 2 and responded by pressing
keys on the com puter keyboard. The subject w as instructed to p ress "1" if the
num ber w as a 1 and a "2" if the num ber w as a 2. O nce the subject
responded, the screen b ecam e blank for 500 ms. This process w as repeated
for every num ber recognition trial. The experim ent took approximately 30
m inutes for each subject to complete.

RESULTS
Lexical decision tim es for nonword targets w ere not investigated.
Inaccurate resp o n ses also w ere not included in the analyses. The overall
group of subjects yielded 94.50 % accurate responses. The low state anxiety
group resulted in 94.02 % accuracy while the high state anxiety group
resulted in 93.83 % accuracy. The low trait anxiety group resulted in 93.92 %
accuracy while the high trait anxiety group resulted in 94.83 % accuracy.
D ata for individual subjects w as averaged for each experim ental condition.
D ata w ere exam ined using general linear model (GLM) analyses. A 2
(target type) x 4 (relationship betw een prime and target) repeated m easu res
ANOVA w as used to analyze th e data. This analysis revealed a main effect
for target type [F (1,93) = 10.04 g <.002] indicating that faster reaction tim es
w ere asso ciated with nonemotional targets
targets

(M = 657.28 ms).

(M = 640.64

ms) than emotional

A main effect for the relationship betw een the

prime and target, referred to a s "relationship", [F (3, 91) = 20.48 g <.0001]
w as also found.

Subjects responded with faster reaction tim es to repeated

w ords pairs (M. = 598.06) than related word pairs (M. = 648.50) [t = 5.18, g <
.0001] which w ere responded to faster than unrelated word pairs

(M =

676.03) [t = 3.27, g < .001]. Table 2 presents m ean reaction tim es for each
condition of this 2 x 4 analysis. Mean reaction tim es are represented
graphically in Figure 1. The original hypotheses w ere investigated using
simple effects tests. No interactions w ere found to be significant.
Hypothesis one postulated that target words primed with the sa m e word
(repeated condition) would yield faster response tim es than target words
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Table 2
Mean Reaction Time (milliseconds) for the Interaction betw een
Target Type, and Relation betw een Words
....

Target Type

Relation betw een Words

Mean
Reaction
Time
(Std Dev)

Emotional

Unrelated Emotional Prime

678.25
(118.75)

Emotional

Unrelated Nonemotional
Prime

676.57
(126.94)

Emotional

R epeated Prime

612.71
(178.34)

Emotional

Related Prime

661.61
(123.70)

Nonemotional

Unrelated Emotional Prime

668.27
(120.48)

Nonemotional

Unrelated Nonemotional
Prime

675.50
(123.69)

Nonemotional

R epeated Prime

583.41
(103.80)

Nonemotional

Related Prime

635.40
(112.52)

Motor Responding

418.07
(44.53)
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700
690
680
a |
670
660
Lexical
Decision
Time
(ms)

650
640
630
620
610
600
590
580
Unrelated
Word Pairs

■1
_
I

Emotional Target
I Nonemotional Target

R elated/R epeated
Word Pairs

V Unrelated Emotional Prime
□ Unrelated Nonemotional Prime
A_ ,
A Related Prime
O R epeated Prime

Note. M eans with similar subscripts are not significantly different
at p < .05.
Figure 1.

Interaction betw een target type and relation betw een words
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primed with an unrelated word (unrelated condition). Data analysis indicated
that this prediction w as supported. Mean resp o n se tim es for repeated prim es
and targ ets

(M = 598.06

ms) w ere significantly faster than unrelated prim es

and targ ets (M. = 676.03 ms) [t = 7.84, £ < .0001]. This finding replicates the
facilitory effect for repetition priming.
H ypothesis two postulated that target words primed with a related word
(related condition) would yield faster resp o n se tim es than target words
primed with an unrelated word (unrelated condition). Data analysis found
that m ean resp o n se time for related primes and targets (JM = 648.50 ms) w ere
significantly faster than unrelated primes and targets (jM = 676.03 ms) [t =
3.27, £ < .001]. This finding replicates the facilitory effect for semantically
related word priming.
H ypothesis three predicted that emotional targets primed with unrelated
em otional w ords would yield faster response tim es than emotional targets
primed with unrelated nonem otional words. A nalyses found that m ean
resp o n se tim es for emotional targets primed with unrelated em otional words

(M = 678.25

ms) w ere not significantly faster than emotional targets primed

with unrelated nonemotional words

(M = 676.57

ms) [e < .87]. This effect w as

not statistically significant. The current data failed to replicate the emotional
priming effect found by Hill and Kemp-W heeler (1989b; Kem p-W heeler & Hill,
1991) and Jackson and G eer (1993b).
H ypothesis four su g g ested that the am ount of facilitation betw een
nonem otional target w ords primed with the sa m e word (repeated
nonem otional condition) and target words primed with unrelated
nonem otional words (unrelated condition) would be g reater than the
facilitation betw een the emotional targets in th e repeated condition and the
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unrelated condition. Although m ean response tim es w ere in the predicted
direction, they did not yield a significant difference (p < .16). Mean facilitation
in resp o n se time betw een nonemotional repeated and unrelated conditions
(M = 92.09 ms) w as not significantly greater than facilitation in resp o n se time
betw een emotional repeated and unrelated conditions (M = 65.54 ms).
T h ese findings do not support the "inhibition of facilitation" found by Jackson
and G eer (1993b).
Hypothesis five predicted that the am ount of facilitation betw een
nonem otional target words primed by unrelated nonem otional w ords
(unrelated condition) and nonemotional target words primed by related
nonem otional words (related condition) would be greater than the facilitation
betw een emotional targets in the unrelated condition and th e related
condition. Again, m ean response tim es w ere in the predicted direction but
did not yield a significant difference (p < .14). Mean facilitation in response
time betw een nonemotional related and unrelated conditions (JM = 40.10 ms)
w as not significantly g reater than facilitation in resp o n se time betw een
emotional related and unrelated conditions (M = 16.64 ms). This finding
failed to replicate the "inhibition of facilitation" found by Jackson and G eer
(1993b).
Hypothesis six predicted that individual differences in state and trait
anxiety would account for a significant am ount of variance in lexical decision
tim es to emotional and nonemotional target words. To exam ine this
prediction, individuals w ere placed into high or low sta te anxiety groups a s
well a s high or low trait anxiety groups. Groups w ere formed independently
for sta te and trait anxiety. Individuals scoring below 32 on either th e state or
trait su b scale of the STAI w ere classified a s "low" anxiety for that subscale.
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Individuals scoring above 39 on either subscale w ere classified a s "high"
anxiety for that subscale. Demographic information regarding th e se groups
is located in Table 1. This data w ere then exam ined using GLM analyses.
S ep arate 2 (anxiety level) x 2 (target type) x 4 (relationship betw een prime
and target) repeated m easu res ANOVAs were used to analyze the effects of
sta te and trait anxiety on lexical decision times.

Analysis Involving S tate Anxiety
In the 2 (state anxiety level) x 2 (target type) x 4 (relationship betw een
prime and target) repeated m easu res ANOVA involving state anxiety two
main effects and a significant three-way interaction were revealed. No twoway interactions w ere found to be significant. The first main effect w as for
target type [F (1,57) = 4.02 £ < .0 4 ]. This effect indicated that reaction tim es
w ere faster for nonemotional targets (JM = 640.69 ms) than emotional targets

(M = 656.36

ms).

This finding replicates the general results of Jackson and

G eer (1993b). The second main effect w as for relationship [E (3, 55) = 15.18
g <.0001]. This effect indicated that subjects responded with faster reaction
tim es to words that w ere repeated

(M = 596.99

related (M. = 648.36 ms) [t = 4.28, £ < .0001].
faster reaction tim es to related word pairs

ms) than words that were
Subjects also responded with

(M = 648.36

ms) than unrelated

word pairs (JM = 675.58 ms) [t = 2.28, £ < .02]. This finding replicates the welldocum ented sem antic and repetition priming facilitory effects described by
Neely (1990).
Results from the above mian effects w ere dependent upon a significant
three-w ay interaction betw een state anxiety, target type, and relationship
betw een prime and target [E (3, 55) = 3.56 £ <.01 ] for their accurate
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interpretation. Table 3 p resen ts m ean reaction tim es for each level of state
anxiety. This three-w ay interaction is graphed in Figure 2. In general, this
interaction indicates that lexical decision tim es were faster for related word
pairs than unrelated word pairs. Also in general, lexical decision tim es were
faster for repeated word pairs than related word pairs. Each anxiety level
had one exception to th e se findings. For the low state anxiety group
resp o n ses to emotional targets in the repeated condition w ere not a s fast a s
resp o n se s to nonemotional targ ets in the repeated condition. For the high
sta te anxiety group resp o n ses to emotional targets in the related condition
w ere not a s fast a s resp o n ses to nonemotional targets in the related
condition. Simple effects te sts were performed to further investigate the
original hypotheses. T h ese results will be outlined briefly. The facilitory
effect for repetition priming w as found for both low state [t = 4.68, p < .0001 ]
and high state anxiety [t = 4.50, p < .0001]. The facilitory effect for related
priming w as found for low state anxiety [t = 2.33, p < .02] but w as not found for
high state anxiety. The emotional priming effect w as not evidenced in either
low or high state anxiety groups.
Both low and high state anxiety groups dem onstrated a distinct lack of
facilitation for emotional word pairs when facilitation w as expected. This lack
of facilitation, however, w as found in different priming conditions for each
anxiety level. The low state anxiety group exhibited significantly less of a
repetition priming facilitory effect for emotional targets
nonemotional targets

(M =

(M = 35.65

ms) than

100.42 ms) [t = 2.08, p < .04]. The high state

anxiety group exhibited significantly less of a related priming facilitory effect
for emotional targets (M. = 11.65 ms) than nonemotional targets
ms) [t = 2.47, p < .02].

(M = 64.76
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Table 3
Mean Reaction Time (milliseconds) for the Interaction between
S tate Anxiety. Target Type, and Relation between Words
Mean Reaction Time
(Std Dev)
■
Low
High
Anxiety
Anxiety

Target Type

Relation between Words

Emotional

Unrelated Emotional Prime

686.10
(113.80)

680.76
(124.02)

Emotional

Unrelated Nonemotional
Prime

679.29
(124.34)

651.10
(129.74)

Emotional

R epeated Prime

650.45
(164.64)

575.20
(114.76)

Emotional

Related Prime

658.05
(120.02)

669.11
(136.87)

Nonemotional

Unrelated Emotional Prime

689.76
(127.62)

657.64
(103.73)

Nonemotional

Unrelated Nonemotional
Prime

682.39
(121.98)

688.05
(136.44)

Nonemotional

R epeated Prime

581.97
(103.98)

587.96
(112.02)

Nonemotional

Related Prime

643.97
(134.77)

623.29
(115.48)

418.98
(46.21)

424.87
(29.67)

Motor Responding
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690 _1_
680
670
660
■ ab'

650 ___
Lexical
Decision
Tim es
(ms)

640 ___
630 ___
620 ___
610
600 ___
590 ___
580
Unrelated Related/Repeated
Word Pairs
Word Pairs

Low S tate Anxiety
Emotional Target
__ _ K1
.
L Z j Nonemotional Target

V

Unrelated Related/Repeated
Word Pairs
Word Pairs

High S tate Anxiety

Unrelated Emotional Prime

□ Unrelated Nonemotional Prime
A
A Related Prime

O R epeated Prime
Note. M eans with similar subscripts are not significantly different
at p < .05.
Figure 2.

Interaction betw een state anxiety, target type, and
relation betw een words
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Analysis Involving Trait Anxiety
In the 2 (trait anxiety level) x 2 (target type) x 4 (relationship betw een
prime and target) repeated m easu res ANOVA involving trait anxiety two main
effects and a three-w ay interaction w ere revealed. No two-way interactions
w ere found to b e significant. The first main effect w as for target type [F (1,67)
= 6.92 p <.01 ] . This effect indicated that reaction tim es were faster for
nonem otional targets
ms).

(M = 639.22

ms) than emotional targets

(M = 656.84

This finding replicates the general results of Jackson and G eer

(1993b). The second main effect w as for relationship [F (3, 65) = 10.04 p
< .0001]. This effect indicated that subjects responded with faster reaction
tim es to words that w ere repeated
related

(M = 647.76

(M = 596.58

ms) [t = 3.33, p < .001].

faster reaction tim es to related word pairs
word pairs

(M = 675.31

ms) than words that w ere

Subjects also responded with

(M = 647.76

ms) than unrelated

ms) [t = 2.74, p < .007]. This finding replicates the

well-docum ented sem antic and repetition priming facilitory effects described
by Neely (1990).
Results from the above mian effects were dependent upon a significant
three-w ay interaction betw een trait anxiety, target type, and relationship
betw een prime and target [F (3, 65) = 2.62 p <.Q5] for their accurate
interpretation. Table 4 p resen ts m ean reaction tim es for each level of trait
anxiety. This three-way interaction is graphed in Figure 3. This interaction
indicates that lexical decision tim es w ere faster for related word pairs than
unrelated word pairs. Lexical decision tim es w ere also faster for repeated
word pairs than related words pairs. Similar to the findings for low and high
sta te anxiety, each trait anxiety level had one exception to th e se general
findings.
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Table 4
Mean Reaction Time (milliseconds) for the Interaction betw een
Trait Anxiety. Target Type, and Relation betw een Words

Target Type

Relation between Words

Mean Reaction Time
(Std Dev)
Low
Anxiety

High
Anxiety

Emotional

Unrelated Emotional Prime

687.26
(117.34)

676.56
(108.10)

Emotional

Unrelated Nonemotional
Prime

689.57
(116.50)

665.65
(126.17)

Emotional

R epeated Prime

680.80
(244.42)

589.52
(121.60)

Emotional

Related Prime

651.01
(104.82)

670.86
(134.16)

Nonemotional

Unrelated Emotional Prime

682.31
(123.41)

668.21
(116.29)

Nonemotional

Unrelated Nonemotional
Prime

676.59
(131.48)

688.34
(130.71)

Nonemotional

R epeated Prime

590.31
(100.42)

589.03
(110.95)

Nonemotional

Related Prime

648.60
(113.83)

633.60
(113.46)

411.15
(43.32)

430.72
(41.32)

Motor Responding
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690

Ha

680
670
660
Lexical
Decision
Tim es
(ms)

650
^

630
620
610
600
590
580
Unrelated Related/Repeated
Word Pairs
Word Pairs

Low Trait Anxiety
■ I

Emotional Target

, .,
□
Nonemotional Target

Unrelated
Word Pairs

Related/Repeated
Word Pairs

High Trait Anxiety

y Unrelated Emotional Prime
□ Unrelated Nonemotional Prime
A
.
j S Related Prime
O R epeated Prime

Note. M eans with similar subscripts are not significantly different
at p < .05.
Figure 3. Interaction betw een trait anxiety, target type, and
relation betw een words
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The low trait anxiety group exhibited significantly less of a repetition priming
facilitory effect for emotional targets

(M = 6.46

ms) than nonemotional targets

(M = 86.28 ms) [t = 2.08, £ < .04]. The high trait anxiety group exhibited
significantly less of a related priming facilitory effect for emotional targets
= 5.7 ms) than nonemotional targets

(M = 54.74

(M

ms) [t = 2.47, £ < .02]. T hese

findings are parallel to the findings for state anxiety. Low anxious subjects
exhibited a lack of facilitation of repetition priming for emotional targets. High
anxious subjects exhibited a lack of sem antic priming for emotional targets
responded to emotional targets in the repeated condition were not a s fast a s
expected for low anxiety subjects. Additional simple effects te sts were
perform ed to investigate the original hypotheses and will be outlined briefly.
The repetition priming facilitory effect w as found for both low trait anxiety [t
= 2.26, p < .03] and high trait anxiety [t = 6.46, £ < .0001]. The facilitory effect
for related priming w as found for low trait anxiety [t = 2.15, £ < .03] but w as
not found for high trait anxiety. The emotional priming effect w as not
evidenced for either low or high trait anxiety groups. The low trait anxiety
group exhibited less of a repetition priming facilitory effect for emotional
targets than nonemotional targets although this trend w as not statistically
significant (£ <.10). The high trait anxiety group exhibited significantly less of
a related priming facilitory effect for emotional targets than nonemotional
targets [t = 2.07, £ < .04],
Hypothesis seven predicted that motor response tim es would vary a s a
function of anxiety level. This w as found for trait anxiety [E (1,67) = 3.67 £
<.05]. This finding prompted th e need to partial out motor resp o n se tim es to
m ore accurately exam ine the interaction betw een anxiety and lexical
decision times. To accomplish this examination, sep arate 2 (anxiety level) x
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2 (target type) x 4 (relationship betw een prime and target) repeated
m easu res ANCOVAs were used to analyze the data. To ensure that the
assum ption of th e homogeneity of slopes w as not violated, the interactions
betw een the covariate and independent variables w ere investigated. T h ese
interactions w ere not significant for either state or trait anxiety subject groups
(p = .39, p = .18, respectively). B ecause this assum ption w as not violated,
ANCOVA analysis w as conducted.

Analysis Involving State Anxiety with Covariate
Re-exam ination of the 2 x 2 x 4 analysis involving state anxiety and using
motor responding a s a covariate continued to reveal a significant three-w ay
interaction betw een state anxiety, target type, and relationship [F (3, 54) =
3.38 £ <.02]. This interaction su ggests that state anxiety accounted for
significant variance in lexical decision reaction tim es above and beyond the
variance accounted for by motor responding.

Analysis Involving Trait Anxiety with Covariate
Re-examination of the 2 x 2 x 4 analysis involving trait anxiety and using
motor responding a s a covariate failed to reveal any main effects or
interactions betw een trait anxiety, target type, and relationship. W hen motor
resp o n se tim es w ere used a s a covariate, all previously resulting significant
main and interaction effects w ere no longer significant. This lack of findings
su g g e sts that motor responding accounted for greater variance in lexical
decision reaction tim es than trait anxiety.
Results indicated that high and low state anxiety are associated with
different patterns of responding to emotional and nonemotional target words,

63

d ep en d en t upon the relationship betw een the prime and target words. In
particular, low state anxious individuals exhibited a lack of facilitation for
repeated emotional targets in com parison to nonemotional targets. They did
not dem onstrate any difference betw een resp o n ses to related emotional and
nonem otional targets. High state anxious individuals exhibited a lack of
facilitation for related emotional targets in com parison to nonemotional
targets. This group did not dem onstrate any difference betw een resp o n ses to
rep eated emotional and nonem otional targets. W hereas low state anxious
individuals dem onstrated a lack of facilitation for emotional words in the
repeated condition, the high state anxious individuals dem onstrated a lack of
facilitation for emotional words in the related condition.

Analysis Involving Social and Physical Threat
D ata from eighty of the original 94 subjects w as exam ined to investigate
threat type of emotional targets and lexical decision times. Emotional targets
w ere classified by the author a s representing either social or physical threat.
Due to limited num bers of experimental trials, this analysis only included
resp o n ses to targets that w ere primed by words with the sam e threat type.
This analysis also excluded targ ets words primed by the sa m e word, in the
repeated condition. Hypothesis eight suggested that individuals with
differing anxiety levels would exhibit differential responding to social and
physical threat stimuli. In particular, it w as predicted that low anxious
subjects would respond slow er to social threat than physical threat stimuli. It
w as also hypothesized that high anxiety subjects would respond faster to
social threat than physical threat stimuli. A 2 (anxiety level) x 3 (threat type)
repeated m easu res ANOVA w as used to analyze the data. Analysis revealed
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a main effect for threat type [F (2,78) = 4.26

q

<.01 ] without an interaction with

state or trait anxiety. The main effect indicated that social threat target words

(M = 704.48

ms) w ere responded to significantly slow er than physical threat

target words

(M = 644.28

ms) [t = 2.78, £ < .006] which did not differ from

nonemotional target words

(M = 642.81

ms). Table 5 presents m ean reaction

tim es for each level of state and trait anxiety.

Table 5

Mean Reaction Time (milliseconds) for Social Threat. Physical
Threat, and Nonemotional Targets

Trait Anxiety
Target Type

Overall
X

(Std Dev)
Social Threat

Physical Threat

Nonemotional

Low
X

High
X

(Std Dev) (Std Dev)

S tate Anxiety
Low
X

High
X

(Std Dev) (Std Dev)

704.48

717.10

725.27

684.57

701.78

(221.29)

(297.51)

(211.19)

(142.24)

(186.56)

644.28

681.01

617.88

677.79

626.29

(130.90)

(138.50)

(121.75)

(149.90)

(117.73)

642.81

657.86

632.50

631.76

639.55

(108.03)

(105.82)

(99.80)

(97.88)

(102.73)

DISCUSSION
The current study ad d ressed five concerns. First, this study served to
replicate the findings of Jackson and G eer (1993b) by dem onstrating less
sem antic facilitory priming for emotional target words in
com parison to nonemotional target words. This effect w as found for high
anxious individuals. Second, this study served to extend th e se findings by
investigating repetition facilitory priming for emotional and nonemotional
target words. The current study's findings dem onstrated less repetition
facilitory priming for emotional target words in com parison to nonemotional
target words. This effect w as found for low anxious individuals. Third, this
study exam ined the interaction betw een th e se facilitory effects and state and
trait anxiety. In general, state and trait anxiety scores w ere associated with
similar patterns of responding. High state and trait anxious individuals
exhibited less sem antic priming for emotional rather than nonemotional
words. Low state and trait anxious individuals exhibited less repetition
priming for emotional rather than nonemotional words. Fourth, this study
exam ined th e interaction betw een anxiety level and motor resp o n se tim es.
Motor resp o n se tim es w ere found to vary a s a function of trait anxiety. O nce
motor resp o n se tim es are covaried from the analysis, all interactions betw een
trait anxiety and lexical decisions were no longer significant. The interactions
betw een state anxiety and lexical decisions m aintained significance. Finally,
this study com pared resp o n ses to social and physical threat-related target
words. R egardless of anxiety level, individuals responded slow er to social
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threat-related target words than physical threat-related target words, which
did not differ from resp o n ses to nonemotional target words.
P erh ap s one of the most interesting results of the current study is the
different pattern of responding exhibited by high and low anxious individuals
and th e implications of this finding on the hypothesized m echanism that
inhibits, or interferes with, the processing of emotional information. In the
current study, th e lack of sem antic facilitory priming for emotional word pairs
found in Jackson and G eer (1993b) w as not found for the overall group of
subjects. In addition, a lack of repetition facilitory priming for emotional word
pairs that w as hypothesized to result from an inhibitory m echanism w as also
not found for the overall group of subjects.
The hypothesized interactions did appear, however, when com paring
high and low anxiety groups. In fact, m em bers of high and low anxiety
groups had different patterns of th e se interactions. Individuals with low state
anxiety exhibited less of a facilitory effect for repeated emotional word pairs
than nonem otional word pairs. The repeated emotional word pair
condition did not yield the facilitation in lexical decision tim es that w as
expected. The low anxiety group did not exhibit any differences betw een the
facilitatory effect for related emotional word pairs and nonem otional related
word pairs.
In contrast to th e se findings, individuals with either high state or trait
anxiety sco res exhibited less of a facilitory effect for related emotional word
pairs than nonemotional word pairs. The related emotional word pair
condition did not yield the facilitation in lexical decision tim es that w as
expected. The high anxiety group did not exhibit any differences betw een
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th e facilitatory effect for repeated emotional word pairs and nonemotional
rep eated word pairs.
The lack of facilitory effects for either related or repeated emotional word
pair conditions is described a s indicating the existence of a m echanism that
inhibits, or interferes with, the processing of emotional information. This
m echanism will be discussed later. It is interesting that the lack of facilitory
effects w as evidenced for both high and low anxiety groups, but not for the
entire subject group overall. It is suggested that similar to the interaction
betw een anxiety level and m otor responding, the relationship betw een
anxiety level and th e se facilitory effects, or lack thereof, m ay not be linear.
U nless the overall group is predominantly high or low anxious, analysis of
th e overall group m ay conceal any differences in responding due to anxiety
level.
The original d ata from Jackson and G eer (1993b) included subjects with
varying levels of anxiety, but th e majority were low anxious individuals. The
overall group of individuals revealed a lack of facilitory effect for related
emotional word pairs which w as taken a s evidence of an inhibitory
m echanism . This effect w as not found for the current low anxiety group. O ne
possible explanation for this discrepancy involves the differing m ethods of
obtaining associated, or related, word pairs. In Jackson and G eer (1993b)
pilot subjects w ere asked to free associate to target words. From th e se free
asso ciates, the prime words w ere selected for the study. Using this
methodology, the resulting asso ciated word pairs may have had m ore
personal relevance for this population of subjects. Personal relevance h a s
been recognized a s an important factor in cognitive processing of emotional
information (Eysenck et al., 1991; M athews & Klug, 1993). In com parison, the
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current study requested that pilot subjects rate the association betw een a
given se t of word pairs. Although the word pairs chosen for the study yielded
high association ratings, th e se pairs may not have personal relevance for the
subjects.
This explanation, however, d o es not ad d ress the lack of facilitory effect for
related emotional word pairs in the high anxiety condition. It is su g g ested
that th e related emotional word pairs may have had personal relevance for
high anxious subjects. It h as been hypothesized that individuals with high
anxiety have m ore elaborate associative networks for threatening information
(Williams et al., 1988). This su g g ests that not only are the links betw een
threatening m eanings stronger but also greater in num ber. More information
m ay be "linked" into th e associative networks of threatening information for
high anxious individuals. Given this hypothesis, it is possible that the links
betw een th e chosen asso ciated word pairs w ere "stronger" or more
personally relevant for the high anxiety group.
The discrepancy of results found for repeated emotional word pairs also
p resen ts an interesting outcom e of this study. The repeated condition w as
designed to investigate a possible inhibitory m echanism in a m anner less
confounded by the restraints of word association. Indeed, the association, or
sem antic relationship, betw een the identical prime and target is
unam biguous and maximal. In addition, an inhibitory, or interfering,
m echanism m ust outweigh th e effects of enhanced lexical a c c e s s and
episodic memory. This condition w as considered a more stringent te st of a
possible inhibitory m echanism . Theories such a s Bower's (1981) su g g est
that em otional words in repetition priming should result in lexical decision
time facilitation. The resulting lack of facilitation in the repetition priming

70

condition for emotional target words, in com parison to nonemotional target
words, supports the existence of an inhibitory, or interfering, m echanism
effecting th e processing of emotional, threat-related information for the low
sta te anxiety group.
T he current investigation w as also designed to exam ine the relationship
betw een anxiety level and motor responding. Motor responding w as found to
vary a s a function of trait anxiety and indicated the utility of using motor
responding a s a covariate in following analyses. O nce motor resp o n se tim es
w ere partialled from the data, interactions with trait anxiety w ere no longer
significant. Motor responding accounted for greater variance in lexical
decision tim es than w as accounted for by high or low trait anxiety.
R egardless of partialling out motor response tim es, the interaction involving
sta te anxiety m aintained significance. This finding su g g ests that sta te anxiety
acco u n ts for significant variance in lexical decision tim es above and beyond
th e variance accounted for by motor responding. This finding also su g g ests
th e previous interpretations for interactions betw een state anxiety, target
emotionality, and the relationship betw een the prime and target are not
obscured by individual differences in motor responding. Interactions
involving trait anxiety, however, w ere invalidated once motor responding w as
taken into account.
The relationship betw een motor responding and anxiety level is of
extrem e im portance to future research involving cognitive task s that require
motor responding. This relationship is especially critical for research
investigating th e cognitive processing of aversive emotional, or threatrelated, information. In m ost tasks, motor responding is assu m ed to be a
random variable. T h ese results indicate that this assum ption is not correct.
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Motor responding is not a random variable and ap p ears to interact greatest
with trait anxiety level. This finding replicates the findings of Jackson and
G eer (1993a) w here anxiety level accounted for significant variance in motor
responding, also indicating that motor responding is not a random variable.
Future research efforts involving cognitive tasks that require motor
responding should consider partialling motor resp o n ses from the d ata to
accurately exam ine the interaction betw een anxiety and cognitive task
perform ance.
This study w as also designed to investigate lexical decision tim es for
social and physical threat-related target words and their interaction with high
an d low anxiety levels. Overall, social threat targets w ere responded to
slow er than physical threat targets which did not differ from resp o n ses to
nonemotional targets. This effect did not interact with sta te or trait anxiety
groups. The general slowing of social threat-related w ords can also be
viewed a s evidence supporting an inhibitory, or interfering, m echanism that
o p erates on aversive emotional, or threat-related, information. As su g g ested
earlier, th e STAI is b ased on social-evaluative issu es (Fox 1993b; 1994).
Any attentional bias or inhibitory process may be most evident for social
threat rather than physical threat targets. B ecause the current study did not
m anipulate th e relationship of social and physical threat targets with social
and physical threat primes, the true nature of facilitation or inhibition of
responding to threat-types is unclear. Future research efforts may be
directed to further investigate this issue.
We now turn our attention m ore directly to the existence of a possible
inhibitory m echanism that o p erates on the cognitive processing of aversive
emotional, or threat-related, information. Som e research ers have reported
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this effect a s an avoidance of processing aversive information (Bonanno,
Davies, Singer, & Schwartz, 1991; Fox 1994). It is unclear if the processing
of information is avoided, or w hether the information is inhibited following the
pre-attentive processing. In fact, it seem s n ecessary for som e processing of
information to have occurred to initiate either an avoiding or inhibiting
process. It is also unclear if information is inhibited by dam pening activation
or that the additional processing is simply interfered with and hindered.
A possible inhibitory m echanism is further supported by evidence that
responding is slowed to stimuli that has previously been ignored (Neumann
& D eSchepper, 1992; Tipper. 1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985; Tipper &
Driver, 1988; Yee, 1991). This effect h as been term ed "negative priming" and
is said to result from inhibition of processing the ignored stimuli. In m ost of
th e se research efforts, subjects are required to respond to a stimulus while
ignoring one or m ore stimuli. In sep arate trials, the target stimuli may be
identical, or similar, to the previous distractor stimuli. The com parison of
resp o n se tim es to targets which have previously been distractors and targets
which have not been distractors serves a s an index of negative priming, or
ignored priming, effects. Tipper and his colleagues have docum ented that
negative priming occurs when the target w as the previous distractor a s well
a s when the target w as semantically related to the previous distractor (Tipper,
1985). The slowing of resp o n ses to a target related to a previous distractors
su g g ests that any inhibition, or interference, with cognitive processing
o p erates through a network of information such a s th o se proposed by
network theories (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus,
1975). The effect of negative priming occurring when the target and
distractor w ere semantically related also occurred when th e stimuli w ere
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presented in different forms (e.g. drawings and words; Tipper & Driver, 1988).
This result w as interpreted a s indicating that inhibition had not merely
effected th e episodic memory but rather the "meaning" of the stimulus.
This effect h a s also been found for both threat-related and neutral
information. A recent investigation h as extended th e se findings by
examining th e am ount of negative priming for threat-related targ ets in
com parison to nonemotional targets (Fox, 1994). The am ount of negative
priming w as also com pared am ong anxiety level groups. Low anxious
individuals w ere found to exhibit greater negative priming than high anxiety
individuals. This result supports the notion that low anxious individuals are
m ore efficient at inhibiting, or interfering with, the processing of threat-related
information. It w as further su g g ested that anxiety disordered individuals have
defective inhibition of threat-related information. It is important, however, to
note th at high anxious individuals are not identical to clinically anxious
individuals, although both groups may exhibit high anxiety scores. Among
other differences, the two groups may differ in the am ount or intensity of an
attentional bias toward threat information. In com parison to anxiety
disordered individuals, high anxiety subjects may also exhibit defective
inhibition but to a lesser d eg ree or intensity. In addition, the dem onstration of
this deficit by high anxiety subjects may rely upon state anxiety level.
In th e current study, high anxiety subjects exhibited a lack of a facilitory
effect for related emotional words which is taken a s evidence for an inhibitory
m echanism . T h ese subjects did not, however, dem onstrate a lack of a
facilitory effect for repeated emotional words. High anxiety subjects revealed
a pattern of resp o n ses indicative of som e, but not complete, interference with
processing emotional information. Fox (1994) h as also suggested that the
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ability to inhibit threat-related information is related to the aw aren ess of the
p resen ted stimulus. S h e hypothesized that inhibition is reduced when the
threat stimuli is presented outside aw areness. High anxious subjects may
only show a com plete lack of inhibition when threat targets are presented
without aw aren ess. This topic requires future research efforts to discover the
param eters of an interaction betw een inhibition and anxiety level.
W e would also like to note an issue of d ebate concerning the statistical
an aly ses of the current study. It can be argued that the dependent variables
(lexical decision tim es for each condition) are not true repeated m easures. It
can also be argued that th e se dependent variables are intercorrelated and
should b est be analyzed using a MANOVA framework. MANOVA analysis
would allow examination of differences in patterns of resp o n ses betw een
groups. In the current investigation, however, only resp o n ses to two of the
eight d ependent variables are predicted to vary betw een groups. A
significant MANOVA would only result if the resp o n ses to th e se two variables
are powerful enough to override the similarities am ong the other six
variables. B ecau se of this lack of power to detect true differences in a
MANOVA framework, it can be argued that a mixed model analysis is most
appropriate. This methodology of analysis, however, varies from the
an aly ses performed in previous studies and literature. Although the current
an aly ses consisting of repeated m easu res ANOVAs may be losing favor
am ong statisticians, it allows for direct com parison of the current study's
results with the results from th e study being replicated and extended
(Jackson & G eer, 1993b). The decision of the most appropriate an aly ses for
future studies of this nature rem ains debated.
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The current investigation h a s resulted in the replication of both sem antic
and repetition priming. Although emotional priming, a s docum ented by Hill
and Kem p-W heeler (1989b), w as not replicated the differential sem antic
priming effects for emotional and nonemotional words, a s docum ented by
Jack so n and G eer (1993b) w as replicated for high anxious individuals.
Differential repetition priming effects for emotional and nonemotional words
w as found for low anxious individuals. The repetition priming effect for
emotional prim es w as significantly lass than the repetition priming for
nonem otional targets. T h ese results are not readily accom m odated by
current theories of emotion and cognition. T hese results do support the
notion of an inhibitory, or interfering, m echanism that interferes with the
processing of emotional information. In conditions containing emotional
prime and target words less repetition and related priming facilitation
occurred than w as expected. Emotional valence in the lexical decision task
w as asso ciated with slow er responding than observed for nonemotional
information. It is sug g ested that this slowing resulted from an inhibition, or
interference with the processing of emotional information. It is also proposed
that this m echanism operates within a sem antic network. This proposal is
supported by results from the current study indicating less related priming for
em otional w ords than nonemotional words. T h e se results, however, w ere
only present for subjects with high state and/or trait anxiety, suggesting that
th e phenom enon is precarious.
This hypothesized inhibitory, or interfering, m echanism h a s implications
for cognitive processing of emotional, or threat-related information. Although
attention to threat is vital to survival, over-responding to threatening
information or th e tendency to interpret am biguous stimuli a s threatening may
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be counter-productive to successful functioning. The ability to inhibit
responding to threat-related information also seem s to be a vital part of an
overall, functioning system . Current m odels of sem antic networks do not
adequately explain the results of the current study along with recent studies
(Fox, 1994; Jackson & Geer, 1993b). T hese studies provide strong support
for the existence of a phenom enon that results in interference of processing
emotional information. The param eters of this phenom enon, however, are
som ew hat elusive.
It a p p e ars that less facilitation for related priming of emotional, in
com parison to nonemotional, information su g g ests that this interference
occurs within a sem antic network system . In contrast, less facilitation for
related priming of emotional, com pared to nonemotional, information
su g g e sts that this interference may occur at either a perceptual level or within
a sem antic network system .

B ecause low anxious subjects exhibited less

facilitation for emotional information in repetition priming and high anxious
subjects exhibited less facilitation for emotional information in related
priming, th e nature of this hypothesized phenom enon rem ains uncertain.
Future replication and extension of the current research are n ecessary to
clarify th e existence and nature of a phenom enon that inhibits, or interferes,
with th e processing of emotional information.
In addition, the current investigation su g g ests that to accurately exam ine
th e interaction betw een anxiety and cognitive perform ance, partialling motor
re sp o n se s from the d ata m ust be considered. The relationship betw een
anxiety and motor responding is of great importance to conclusions drawn
from cognitive task experim ents that require motor responding. Most
investigations, however, assu m e motor responding to be a random variable.

77

The current investigation's results indicate that motor responding is
associated with trait anxiety level and is not a random variable.
Future research efforts are required to further docum ent the proposed
inhibitory m echanism that h a s been described and dem onstrated in this
study. It is accepted that identification of threat-related information is
beneficial to survival. If low anxious individuals dem onstrate this ability, but
are also able adequately a s s e s s the actual risk of danger, it is important to
understand the m echanism by which this occurs. Understanding the
functioning of low-anxious individuals serv es to increase the understanding
of the dysfunction of high anxious and clinically anxious individuals. In
particular, this line of research may increase our knowledge concerning how
treatm ents designed to reduce dysfunctional anxiety achieve their goals. In
addition, this line of research a d d re sse s the integration of cognitive and
emotional sy stem s and implies that cognition and emotion not only function
a s a team but are necessary to the other.
Potential av en u es for continued research include com paring groups with
differing levels of anxiety with anxiety-disordered individuals, com paring
inhibitory effects upon social threat and physical threat targets for individuals
with varying levels of anxiety, and examining inhibited responding to threatrelated information presented with and without conscious aw aren ess. It is
hoped that the current study will encourage further investigation of an
inhibitory m echanism that o p erates on the processing of aversive emotional,
or threat-related, information.
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APPENDIX A.
EMOTIONALITY AND FAMILIARITY RATINGS OF TARGET WORDS
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Emotional Target Words

Emotionality

Familiarity

m urder

-2.95

3.27

ca n c e r

-2.80

3.94

w ar

-2.75

3.50

terror

-2.35

2.86

grief

-2.30

2.93

injury

-2.05

3.59

je a lo u s

-1.95

4.44

d re a d

-1.49

3.56

fatal

-2.90

2.77

killer

-2.80

2.78

p lag u e

-2.70

2.10

d is e a s e

-2.50

3.68

burglar

-

2.20

2.87

d e sp ise d

-2.05

2.76

hurt

-1.85

4.69

sting

-1.50

2.76

poison

-2.85

2.45

d eath

-2.85

3.48

torture

-2.70

2.46

b e a te n

-2.55

2.82

accident

-

2.20

4.27

cripple

-

2.10

2.56

illness

-1.80

3.88

rude

-1.65

4.36

shaking

-1.73

4.59
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bites

-1.88

5.27

m ean

-1.52

5.73

resen ts

-2.10

4.32

ac h e

-1.60

5.66

ailm ent

-1.23

3.86

fears

-2.13

5.57

d eteste d

-2.00

3.86

m angle

-1.88

3.55

mourn

-2.42

4.11

robbers

-1.88

4.57

crashing

-1.79

4.59

b ad

-1.65

6.36

blight

-0.46

2.00

torm ent

-2.38

3.66

horror

-2.42

4.84

afflict

-1.48

3.61

abused

-2.65

4.98

brutal

-2.38

4.39

toxic

-2.33

4.55

d eadly

-2.52

5.02

tum ors

-2.31

3.59

sn ip er

-1.21

3.16

drown

-2.50

4.39
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Nonemotional Target Words

Emotionality

Familiarity

g a ra g e

0.00

3.28

jacket

0.30

3.99

bee

-0.10

3.14

b ask et

0.05

2.96

glove

-0.05

2.80

recipe

0.15

3.62

blanket

0.30

4.47

brave

1.40

3.52

e a g le

0.70

2.31

m argin

0.00

2.83

b ronze

0.30

2.11

m atch es

-0.25

3.66

costum e

0.14

2.84

m arkings

-0.05

2.65

dirt

0.20

4.29

queen

0.40

2.56

oyster

-0.30

2.71

cloth

0.10

3.48

recruit

0.00

2.57

lad d er

0.05

2.85

um brella

0.15

4.30

-0.05

2.46

0.00

3.89

foot

-0.10

4.63

saltine

-0.17

3.48

tractor
eyebrow
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crown

0.69

3.52

soil

0.06

4.66

bedding

0.71

3.66

shoe

0.31

6.32

facial

0.56

4.75

tough

-0.46

6.05

tracings

0.00

2.68

plowing

-0.06

3.30

hands

0.31

6.27

th eater

0.63

5.43

raincoat

0.25

4.77

bug

-0.52

6.00

ta n n ed

0.81

5.32

enlists

0.06

3.30

picnic

1.17

4.25

lighter

0.60

5.30

stepping

0.25

4.64

carport

0.04

4.18

-0.23

2.16

p earls

1.38

4.50

blazer

0.31

3.41

border

-0.06

4.55

loom s

-0.65

2.41

talon
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E-Related

E

N

T araet

Prime

Prime

Prime

m urder

suffer

w aters

brutal

ca n ce r

prison

mirror

tum ors

w ar

fat

hat

bad

terror

lonely

circle

horror

grief

cu rse

chair

mourn

fearful

ch eated

cushion

shaking

jea lo u s

u s e le ss

curtain

resen ts

d re ad

blam e

wrist

fears

fatal

cruel

ow ner

toxic

killer

morbid

p lasm a

sniper

p lag u e

threat

sm ooth

blight

d is e a s e

a ssau lt

lettuce

afflict

burglar

shatter

trailer

robbers

d e sp ise d

h elp less

b o o k case

d etested

hurt

bom b

tray

ac h e

sting

fault

train

bites

poison

m ugger

rhythm

deadly

d eath

sh a m e

close

drown

torture

choking

prairie

torment

b ea ten

stupid

cradle

a b u se d

accident

d efeated

b aseb all

crashing

cripple

worried

p ack ag e

m angle

illness

dislike

balcony

ailm ent

rude

harm

salt

m ean

E
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N

E

N-Related

T araet

Prime

Prime

Prime

g a ra g e

yellow

broken

carport

jacket

signal

boring

blazer

bee

hot

shy

bug

b ask et

p ep p e r

victim

picnic

glove

paint

te n se

h an d s

cracker

m achine

neglect

saltine

blanket

pattern

a sh a m e d

bedding

brave

plant

germ s

tough

e a g le

onion

annoy

talon

m argin

shovel

coffin

border

b ro n ze

fields

freeze

tan n ed

m atch es

context

failure

fighter

costum e

cabbage

d esp air

th eater

m arkings

su itcase

sickness

tracings

dirt

rope

pain

soil

queen

catch

shock

crown

oyster

n ee d le

crisis

pearls

cloth

porch

break

looms

recruit

blen d er

tram ple

enlists

lad d er

carpet

lethal

stepping

umbrella stimulus

lo n esom e

raincoat

tractor

prom ise

foolish

plowing

eyebrow

percent

terrify

facial

foot

fuse

jail

sh o e

N
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Emotional Word Pair

Rating of Relationship

T araet

Prime

m urder

brutal

5.81

w ar

b ad

5.03

d rea d

fears

4.51

fearful

shaking

5.69

fatal

toxic

6.27

p lag u e

blight

4.42

d e sp ise d

d etested

6.12

sting

bites

5.57

poison

deadly

6.21

torture

torm ent

6.27

cripple

m angle

5.21

rude

m ean

4.60

ca n c e r

tum ors

6.27

terror

horror

6.42

grief

mourn

6.21

jea lo u s

resen ts

4.36

killer

sniper

6.24

d is e a s e

afflict

4.30

burglar

robbers

6.66

hurt

ache

5.96

death

drown

6.42

b ea ten

ab u se d

6.30

accident

crashing

6.00

illness

ailm ent

5.69

Nonemotional Word Pair

Rating of Relationship

T araet

Prime

saltine

cracker

6.27

crown

queen

5.87

soil

dirt

6.48

bedding

blanket

5.84

sh o e

foot

6.60

facial

eyebrow

4.84

tough

brave

4.96

tracings

m arkings

4.57

plowing

tractor

6.24

hands

glove

6.42

th eater

costum e

5.84

raincoat

um brella

5.57

bug

bee

4.72

tan n ed

bronze

5.39

enlists

recruit

5.36

picnic

b asket

6.36

lighter

m atches

5.51

stepping

ladder

5.00

carport

g a ra g e

6.48

talon

e a g le

5.90

p earls

oyster

6.24

b lazer

jacket

6.39

border

margin

5.09

loom s

cloth

4.81

APPENDIX D.
STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY
EXAMPLES
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S tate Anxiety Q uestionnaire
1= not at all

2= som ew hat

3= moderately so

4= very much so

A. I feel at e a s e ........................................................................... (1) (2)

(3) (4)

B. I feel upset

(3) (4)

(1) (2)

Trait Anxiety Q uestionnaire
1= alm ost never

2= som etim es

3= often

4= almost always

A. I am a steady person

(1) (2) (3) (4)

B. I lack self-confidence

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VITA

Sheryl R ene' Jackson received her B.S. d eg ree in Psychology with a
minor in G enetics from T exas A & M University in 1989. S he received her
M aster's d eg ree in Clinical Psychology from Louisiana S tate University in
1991. While completing her internship in clinical psychology at the University
of A labam a at Birmingham School of Medicine sh e also com pleted her
doctoral dissertation on cognitive processing of threat-related information for
high and low anxious individuals. S h e received her Ph.D. d eg ree in Clinical
Psychology with a minor in Kinesiology in 1994. S he is currently an
A ssistant Professor in the Departm ent of Psychiatry at the University of
A labam a at Birmingham School of Medicine. S he is co-director of the
Anxiety D isorders Clinic and O bsessive-C om pulsive Disorders Clinic. S h e is
actively involved in research concerning etiology, a ssessm en t, and treatm ent
of anxiety disorders and im pulse control disorders.

98

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate:
Major Field:

Sheryl R. Jackson

Psychology

Title of Dissertation:

Effects of Threat-Related Emotional Information in
a Lexical Decision Task: Examination of Cognitive
and Motor Performance

Approved:

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean 'of the Graduate School

E X A M IN IN G

£

C O M M IT T E E :

.5

~r

( J /)

Date of Examination:
August 30, 1994

